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 “Myers: I would say, despite their age, these are very, very dangerous people. . . . So they may 
be juveniles, but they’re not on a little-league team anywhere, they’re on a major league team, 
and it’s a terrorist team. . . . 
. . . . 
Rumsfeld: . . . . [T]his constant refrain of ‘the juveniles,’ as though there’s a hundred . . . 
children in there—these are not children. Dick Myers responded to that.”1 
 
--News Briefing with Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers 
 
“As this discussion establishes, ‘[o]ur history is replete with laws and judicial recognition’ that 
children cannot be viewed simply as miniature adults.”2 
 
--J.D.B. v. North Carolina 
 
“One of my motivations in seeking a reasonable resolution of the case is that, as a juvenile at 
the time of his capture, Jawad should have been segregated from the adult detainees, and 
some serious attempt made to rehabilitate him. I am bothered by the fact that this was not 
done. I am a resolute Catholic and take as an article of faith that justice is defined as 
reparative and restorative, and that Christ’s most radical pronouncement—command, if you 
will—is to love one’s enemies.”3 
 
--Lt. Col. Darrel J. Vandevald 
Introduction 
Omar Khadr, age fifteen and a citizen of Canada, was given emergency medical care and 
taken into custody by U.S. forces in Afghanistan on July 27, 2002.4 The U.S. military had 
been in that country since October of 2001, a month after the devastating attacks on the 
United States of September 11. Omar Khadr was, by virtually all definitions in national and 
international law, a child on the date of his initial custody and detention, and of course on all 
prior dates of his alleged criminal acts. On the day of his capture, Omar was involved in a 
prolonged military encounter with deaths on both sides including, very nearly, his own. Some 
would thus first characterize him not as a child but as a combatant—“child soldier” is the 
                                                                                                                               
 1. U.S. Dep’t of Def., News Transcript, DoD News Briefing with Sec’y Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers (Apr. 
25, 2003), http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2510. 
 2. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 2404 (2011) (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 
115–16 (1982)). J.D.B. held that “so long as the child’s age was known to the officer at the time of 
police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in 
the custody analysis is consistent with the objective nature of that test” and if in custody for alleged 
criminal conduct, the child must be given Miranda warnings. Id. at 2406. 
 3. Declaration of Lt. Col. Darrel J. Vandeveld ¶ 6, United States v. Jawad (Military Comm’n 
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, Sept. 22, 2008) (discussing his resignation as chief prosecutor in another 
juvenile prosecution at Guantanamo), available at 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/propublica/assets/docs/vandeveld_declaration_080922.pdf. 
 4. Stipulation of Fact ¶¶ 35–46, United States v. Khadr (Military Comm’n Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, 
Oct. 13, 2010), available at 
http://media.miamiherald.com/smedia/2010/10/26/19/stip2.source.prod_affiliate.56.pdf. 
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term most often applied in such situations, but the more neutral “child in armed conflict” is 
generally used here.5 The United States government, however, treated him neither as a child 
nor as a traditional combatant, as will be developed below. The U.S. courts meekly followed 
the military’s definitional lead. 
Omar, badly wounded with two near-fatal gunshots to the back, was held and interrogated 
immediately and aggressively at Bagram Air Force Base near Kabul for several months 
before his transfer to Guantanamo Bay, but not until after he had turned sixteen.6 Omar 
spent two more years at Guantanamo undergoing regular, routine, and sometimes brutal 
interrogation without representation by counsel, and four years in all before he was charged 
by a military commission with war crimes.7 He was ultimately classified by the United States 
government as an “alien unprivileged enemy belligerent,” susceptible to charges by military 
commission for his unlawful acts in combat. It was the view of commission prosecutors that 
this status denied him the protections of both human rights and humanitarian law, for 
reasons that will be developed below. This essay, consistent with the overall theme of this 
symposium, explores the intersections and tensions between international human rights law 
and international humanitarian law as those two doctrinal areas played out in the concrete 
situation of Omar Khadr, with particular focus on how issues regarding his youth were 
addressed by the many tribunals involved. 
The issues on Omar’s youth span many contexts, raising judicial questions regarding the 
legality of his detention, his treatment and separation from adults while detained, 
jurisdiction to prosecute him for war crimes, and the inadmissibility of statements based on 
his youth. My thesis here is simple: None of the tribunals that reviewed Omar’s legal issues, 
national or international, gave proper attention to his status as a child, nor to the special 
obligations in both human rights and humanitarian law with regard to that status. Some 
ignored the status and some distinguished it away, but no final judicial decision 
acknowledged his juvenile status as a factor in the analysis, whether relief was granted or 
not. Omar as a trope for terrorist won out every time over Omar as a trope for child victim of 
war. Omar was neither the youngest juvenile nor the only juvenile at Guantanamo, and he 
was not the first juvenile in modern history to be tried for war crimes, but his treatment as an 
                                                                                                                               
 5. Professor Mark Drumbl suggests in a forthcoming book that the terminology in the field has moved 
toward “children associated with armed forces or [armed] groups,” acknowledging its “somewhat 
tongue-tying” nature. See Mark A. Drumbl, Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and 
Policy, (Washington & Lee Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 2011–17, 2011) 
(manuscript at 4), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1921527, in 
MARK A. DRUMBL, REIMAGINING CHILD SOLDIERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY (forthcoming 
2012). I will use the term in this text. 
 6. The best and most accurate portrayal of the interrogation regime at Bagram during that period of 
time is in the documentary film, TAXI TO THE DARK SIDE (Discovery Channel 2007), which depicts a 
chilling examination of torture and death at Bagram. Omar Khadr’s interrogators were among those 
interviewed on-screen. 
 7. Because we all have become inured with, or perhaps numbed by, the issue of prolonged detention at 
Guantanamo without trial, we have lost our shock at the unlawfulness of untimely trial itself. We 
must note that most U.S. jurisdictions require trial within 90 to 180 days of detention of the accused 
or risk having all charges dismissed for failure to honor the constitutional obligation of speedy trial. 
See Richard J. Wilson, It’s About Time for Gitmo Men, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Mar. 24, 2009, 
7:43 PM), http://bangordailynews.com/2009/03/24/opinion/itrsquos-about-time-for-gitmo-men/. 
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adult for alleged crimes committed as a child was and is a national shame and a terrible 
example to the world. As I note in the conclusion to this Article, Omar’s sentencing may have 
been the only phase of his detention in which his youth played any role, albeit implicit. We 
are left to guess what happened off the record. 
I served as pro bono counsel for Omar Khadr between October of 2004 and the spring of 
2007, when we ceased representation at his request.8 During those years, I visited with him 
in the detention facilities at Guantanamo on about a dozen occasions and appeared as his 
lawyer in habeas corpus proceedings to challenge his detention in the federal courts of 
Washington, D.C. I also served as his civilian counsel in the first military commission 
hearings held at Guantanamo, prior to the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, which struck down the commissions as then composed.9 In addition, as part of our 
work in the International Human Rights Law Clinic at American University, I appeared with 
students in federal court and at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, first on 
behalf of all detainees at Guantanamo, and later seeking precautionary measures from the 
United States government on behalf of Omar Khadr, based largely on his age at the time of 
his capture. I can safely say, as a personal matter, that this was the single most demanding, 
and most interesting, case of my legal career. 
Because he was Canadian, Omar had Canadian lawyers who raised legal challenges in the 
domestic courts there, to the extent that those courts were able to intervene in the U.S. legal 
process. Those lawyers drew on arguments regarding Omar’s youth at the time of the events 
that resulted in his detention, and they were remarkably successful in obtaining favorable 
decisions on Omar’s behalf. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan, the Republican-
dominated U.S. Congress quickly reconstituted the military commissions through new 
legislation, and Omar was again charged with the crimes to which he eventually pled guilty. 
New military lawyers were appointed to represent Omar, and his Canadian lawyers took on 
the role of “legal advisors” to him at Guantanamo. After our work on Omar’s behalf ended in 
the spring of 2007, his appointed military defense lawyers continued to raise issues regarding 
his youth and status in both habeas corpus and military commission contexts. It is the 
combined advocacy on behalf of Omar Khadr in a rich array of tribunals—U.S. and Canadian 
federal courts, military commissions, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and 
the United Nations—from which this essay emerges. 
I will first examine, in Part I, the broad context of the Khadr case. That context includes 
the Khadr family background, the relevant law relating to children in armed conflict, the 
overall situation of juvenile detainees at Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere, and a bit of history 
                                                                                                                               
 8. From the outset, I worked closely with co-counsel, Professor Muneer Ahmad, a colleague on the 
faculty at American University’s Washington College of Law. We mostly visited Omar together, 
although occasionally we each visited him separately, and on one occasion I was joined by Professor 
Kristine Huskey, another faculty member. Students in the International Human Rights Law Clinic 
assisted in all aspects of representation discussed in this Article, to the extent that their clearance 
status permitted. With the exception of one semester, no student was given security clearance that 
would permit access to classified documents, including client statements, unless they were cleared 
for public viewing by a review panel set up for that purpose. Virtually all documents relating to this 
case were classified. 
 9. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
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on the prosecution of children in armed conflict. In Part II, I will document the efforts to put 
the issue of Omar’s youth before the Washington federal court in habeas corpus proceedings, 
including some effort to develop the facts relating to Omar’s capture and subsequent 
detention in Afghanistan and Guantanamo. In Part III, I will examine the ways in which the 
question of juvenile status affected military commission proceedings, both before and after 
the Hamdan decision. In Part IV, the role of the Canadian courts in this complex array of 
litigation will be explored through the lens of Omar’s age. I will examine the ways in which 
the issue of Omar’s youth was addressed in proceedings before the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights in Part V, and Part VI will discuss the outcome of the Khadr 
case. It will also offer my own conclusions and reflections on the ways in which the 
international law of armed conflict and human rights interacted in these proceedings. 
I.   Context: The Khadr Family, the Law, Juveniles Detained at 
Guantanamo Bay and Elsewhere, and Juveniles in War Crimes 
Trials in History 
It is difficult to decide what constitutes the full factual context of the “Khadr case.” A full 
recitation of Omar Khadr’s factual narrative is either forbidden or contested. It is forbidden 
because of the draconian limitations placed on all Guantanamo defense lawyers regarding 
disclosure of factual information obtained from their clients, or regarding their cases in 
general: virtually all information is treated either as “classified” or “protected,” with such 
protections justified on national security grounds.10 It is contested because so much about 
Guantanamo and its detainees has yet to become public through careful investigation and 
historical clarification. And Omar’s own voice is still silent or stifled, although small snippets 
of his personal narrative have slipped through the censor’s efforts to suppress them. 
If the crucible of a trial is the vehicle for arriving at the truth of the status of the 
Guantanamo detainees themselves, one must recall that of the 779 total detainees ever held 
at Guantanamo, only seven have been convicted of any crime by the commissions: five, 
including Omar, by guilty plea; and two by trial.11 Another was transferred to the United 
States for prosecution in the federal courts. The military commissions, even in their post-
Hamdan iteration, are subject to strong and justified criticism for their lack of fundamental 
fairness and transparency. The remaining cases, all in habeas corpus proceedings, continue a 
slow slog through the courts. 
                                                                                                                               
 10. For the best summary of these limitations, in my view, see David Luban, Lawfare and Legal Ethics 
in Guantánamo, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1981, 1990–92, 1994 (2008). The most recent absurdity in these 
limitations is the effort by government lawyers to prevent the Guantanamo defense lawyers from 
using or disseminating in any way the materials regarding Guantanamo detainees posted on 
Wikileaks, which can be read and freely disseminated by anyone else in the world. Scott Shane, 
Detainees’ Lawyers Can’t Click on Leaked Documents, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/27/world/guantanamo-files-detainees-lawyers-restricted-leaked-
documents.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  
 11. Guilty Verdicts for Guantanamo Prisoners, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 5, 2012), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20120305/cb-guantanamo-plea-deal-glance/ [hereinafter 
Guilty Verdicts]. 
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According to counts by lawyers involved in detainee representation, there are still 171 men 
at Guantanamo.12 Thirty-six men in all have been referred for prosecution by military 
commission, with one, Ahmed Ghailani, transferred to the United States for prosecution, 
where he was convicted in federal court proceedings.13 Of the cases in court on habeas corpus, 
there have been sixty-three decisions on the merits in the federal district courts, with thirty-
eight grants and twenty-five denials.14 Of those cases, there have been twenty-one active 
appeals submitted for decision, with sixteen decisions from the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia, and five petitions for certiorari pending as of December 2011.15 To date, 
no detainee has been released as a result of court order in the U.S. federal courts in habeas 
corpus.  
A. The Khadr Family 
One struggles with the question of how to view the events surrounding the Khadr case; 
through the narrow, close-up lens of the single armed confrontation in Afghanistan that led to 
his prosecution by military commission; through a focus on his prolonged detention, relentless 
interrogation and mistreatment by his captors at Bagram Air Force Base and later at 
Guantanamo; through the broader lens of Omar’s own life and that of his family; or through 
the sweeping history of radical Islam, which both precedes and follows the attacks against the 
United States on September 11, 2001.16 I will start with the Khadr family, and provide 
greater information about Omar’s own story in the conclusion to this Article. 
The Khadr family was famous—or infamous—in Canada well before Omar’s arrest. His 
father, Ahmed, had been arrested in 1995 for his alleged role in the bombing of the Egyptian 
embassy in Pakistan’s capital, Islamabad. The Canadian government had intervened in order 
to obtain Ahmed’s return to Canada, and all charges were eventually dropped. While no 
charge was ever filed against Ahmed Khadr alleging criminal links to al-Qaeda, Canadians 
generally associated the whole Khadr family with Ahmed’s designation, in the popular 
imagination, as “al Kanadi,” the Canadian jihadist.17 The Khadr family was, in short, 
                                                                                                                               
 12. Posting of Davis H. Remes, remesdh@gmail.com, to gtmo@gtmolawyers.org (Dec. 19, 2011) (on file 
with author). 
 13. Id. Ghailani was prosecuted for his role in the U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, and 
was sentenced to life imprisonment in January of 2011. Benjamin Weiser, Ex-Detainee Gets Life 
Sentence in Embassy Blasts, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/26/nyregion/26ghailani.html. 
 14. Posting of Brian Foster, bfoster@cov.com, to gtmo@gtmolawyers.org (Dec. 6, 2011) (on file with 
author). 
 15. Id. 
 16. For a discussion of the issue of the instability of the concept of time-framing in law, see Mark 
Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591, 593–95 
(1981). One scholar, a philosopher teaching law, ponders whether a rationally consistent act 
requirement can be justified at all in the criminal law. Douglas Husak, Rethinking the Act 
Requirement, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2437, 2459 (2007) (“[W]e should not be confident about whether 
criminal law contains an act requirement . . . .”). 
 17. Perhaps the most inflammatory of the books accusing the Khadr family of links to terrorism is 
Stuart Bell’s COLD TERROR: HOW CANADA NURTURES AND EXPORTS TERRORISM AROUND THE WORLD 
(2004). Chapter 6 of that fustian rant is titled The Al Kanadi Family Jihad. However, Omar himself 
is described in the book as a “very sweet, simple and easygoing person . . . loved by all his family and 
friends. . . . He is known to be trustworthy. He mainly sticks with . . . mom and dad. . . . ‘He can’t kill 
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notorious not only in their hometown of Scarborough, a suburb of Toronto, but throughout the 
country. 
Ahmed Khadr died in an armed confrontation in Pakistan on October 3, 2003, a year after 
Omar arrived at Guantanamo. His youngest brother, Kareem, who was with his father at the 
time of his capture, would survive but return to Canada in a wheelchair with a severed 
spine.18 Omar’s next oldest brother, Abdurahman, spent some time with him at Guantanamo 
and was said to have worked as an informant for the CIA,19 while Abdullah, the oldest Khadr 
sibling, was sought by the United States for his alleged terrorist activities. Abdullah was 
returned to Canada in December 2005 from Pakistan, where he had been held in custody and 
interrogated using methods so brutal that the statements he made were rendered 
unreliable.20 This famously caused the Canadian courts to deny a request for his extradition 
to the United States.21 Abdullah was subsequently freed. Omar’s eldest sister, Zaynab, 
appears in Lawrence Wright’s Pulitzer Prize-winning book, The Looming Tower, as a friend 
and confidant of the family of Osama bin Laden.22 In short, the Khadr family legacy weighs 
heavily on Omar. It unquestionably played a role in Canada’s decision, alone among U.S. 
allies, not to seek repatriation. Canadian officials, however, did make efforts to obtain more 
favorable treatment for Omar as a juvenile, as will be documented in the section of this 
Article on Canadian court actions. Those efforts, like all others appealing to the U.S. 
government, fell on deaf ears. 
B. The Law: “Soldiers” in Redefined Paradigms 
The law at Guantanamo, and more broadly in the “war on terror,” is opaque, much like the 
facts. The United States government’s legal branches and agencies suffered from a special 
kind of hubris, brought on by the government’s vengeful, if understandable, response to the 
attacks of 9/11. The approach to international law after 9/11 developed in response to many 
factors, including ignorance, sometimes willful or politically expedient; the right hand not 
knowing what the left was doing; and most importantly, the redefinition of concepts and 
whole doctrines to serve the purposes of national security and to justify harsh and aggressive 
conduct in retaliation for the attacks. The government, in short, gave new meaning to 
international law as “soft law” by manipulating it to serve political ends.23 
                                                                                                                               
a fly.’ ” Id. at 169. With that fragment of his character, it is then said that “he would also fall into 
the grip of Al Qaeda.” Id. Another newly issued Canadian title takes a similarly hostile line against 
Omar. EZRA LEVANT, THE ENEMY WITHIN: TERROR, LIES, AND THE WHITEWASHING OF OMAR KHADR 
(2012). 
 18. MICHELLE SHEPHARD, GUANTANAMO’S CHILD: THE UNTOLD STORY OF OMAR KHADR 85 (2008). 
 19. Id. at 141–44. 
 20. United States of America v. Khadr, 2011 ONCA 358, ¶ 25 (noting exclusion of statement on grounds 
that it was unreliable and “gathered in an abusive manner”), ¶¶ 65–66 (upholding exclusion) (Can. 
Ont.), available at http://www.ontariocourts.on.ca/decisions/2011/2011ONCA0358.pdf 
 21. The appeal affirming the denial of extradition can be found at United States of America v. Khadr, 
2011 ONCA 358 (Can. Ont.), available at 
http://www.ontariocourts.on.ca/decisions/2011/2011ONCA0358.pdf. 
 22. LAWRENCE WRIGHT, THE LOOMING TOWER: AL-QAEDA AND THE ROAD TO 9/11, 284–90 (2006). 
 23. That many of those positions have not changed in the decade since 9/11, when calmer and more 
careful approaches could have replaced them and under new presidential leadership, should deeply 
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The most fundamental redefinitions, for example, are relevant to the legal terrain under 
study here, and deserve explication before beginning a more detailed study of the law 
applicable to children in war. They relate to the law of territorial jurisdiction and the issue of 
the principle of distinction between “civilian” and “soldier” in humanitarian law. One of the 
first legal actions taken on behalf of the Guantanamo detainees was the filing of a petition by 
certain NGOs and individuals, including the author, to the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (“Commission” or “Inter-American Commission”). The Inter-American 
Commission is an independent organ of the Organization of American States (OAS), based in 
Washington, D.C., and composed of seven experts in human rights, appointed in their 
individual capacities. Together with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
headquartered in San Jose, Costa Rica, the two bodies make up the regional human rights 
protection mechanism for the Americas. According to the Commission, the United States is 
susceptible to its jurisdiction; however, because the United States has not ratified the 
principal human rights treaty of the Americas, the American Convention on Human Rights, 
it is not subject to the court’s powers. The Commission uses its powers, inter alia, to hear 
contentious cases, to comment on human rights situations or issues, and to make local visits 
to countries in the Americas.24 
The petition against the United States for its actions in Guantanamo was filed on 
February 25, 2002, just after the first detainees began arriving at the base in Cuba. It asked 
that the U.S. government take precautionary measures25 to determine the status and protect 
the human rights of detainees then held incommunicado. No names or exact number of 
detainees, and no countries of origin were known publically at this point, and no 
communication was permitted by detainees with the outside world.26 The Commission 
quickly issued its decision on March 12, 2002. It called on the United States to “take the 
urgent measures necessary to have the legal status of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay 
determined by a competent tribunal.”27 Given the doubt that existed about the status of the 
detainees in international law, the need for resolution by a competent tribunal was urgent.28 
The decision was the first of its kind by any adjudicative body, domestic or international, to 
address the human rights of the detainees. It reiterated a well-established framework for its 
                                                                                                                               
disturb not just scholars in the field, but all who may fall within the scope of the U.S. exercise of 
global power. 
 24. There are many more treaties on human rights in the region of the Americas, and this thumbnail 
sketch of the Commission’s powers only begins to document its many roles in human rights 
protection. The United States government has never accepted the claim by the Commission that it is 
susceptible to Commission jurisdiction. For additional commentary on the issue of U.S. 
exceptionalism and the Inter-American human rights system, see Richard J. Wilson, The United 
States’ Position on the Death Penalty in the Inter-American Human Rights System, 42 SANTA CLARA 
L. REV. 1159 (2002). 
 25. See infra Part V.A (explaining precautionary measures in greater depth). 
 26. Request by the Center for Constitutional Rights, the Human Rights Clinic at Columbia Law School 
and the Center for Justice and International Law for Precautionary Measures under Article 25 of 
the Commission’s Regulations, (Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Feb. 25, 2002) (on file with author). 
 27. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR): Decision on Request for Precautionary 
Measures (Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba), 41 I.L.M. 532, 532 (2002) [hereinafter Detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba]. 
 28. Id. 
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analysis: “international human rights law applies at all times, in peacetime and in situations 
of armed conflict.”29 In times of armed conflict, the Commission asserted, “no person . . . is 
devoid of legal protection for his or her fundamental and non-derogable human rights.”30 
Moreover, the Commission anticipated the extraterritorial jurisdiction aspect of the decision 
of the United States Supreme Court in Rasul v. Bush31 by more than two years, by grounding 
its decision on the jurisdictional concept that the United States exercised exclusive control 
over the detainees, even if the detainees were non-U.S. nationals outside of U.S. territory: 
“The determination of a state’s responsibility for violations of the international human rights 
of a particular individual turns not on that individual’s nationality or presence within a 
particular geographic area, but rather on whether, under the specific circumstances, that 
person fell within the state’s authority and control.”32 
The United States government took its first public position on the legal framework within 
which the status of Guantanamo detainees should be determined in its initial submission to 
the Commission, which was transmitted to the petitioners on April 12, 2002.33 In that 
document, the government asserted that “international human rights law is not applicable to 
the conduct of hostilities or the capture and detention of enemy combatants, which are 
governed by the more specific laws of armed conflict.”34 International human rights law, in 
the view of the U.S. government, does not apply at all, being pre-empted by the law of war, in 
this case the war on terror. At least one scholar writing on this position asserts unequivocally 
that it is wrong: “In time of armed conflict or other emergency, at a minimum states are 
obliged to protect a ‘core’ of rights under treaty and customary human rights law.”35 Another 
scholar, Gary Solis, leaves the issue technically unresolved but leans against the United 
States. Solis, a former military lawyer, notes the American position and then states: “Many 
disagree, particularly Europeans, the ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross], the 
ICJ [International Court of Justice], and human rights activists from anywhere.”36 To the 
extent that international human rights law does not apply at all in situations of armed 
conflict, the rights of children would of course be significantly diminished. 
The international law relating to the status and treatment of soldiers and civilians is 
found principally in the four Geneva Conventions and their two additional protocols, as well 
as in other treaties and customary humanitarian law, all of which seek to make more 
humane the horror of war. But the most central legal question in Omar Khadr’s prosecution 
by military commission arose not from the Geneva Convention texts, but from an older, 
customary law norm, that of the combatant’s privilege, which allows legitimate combatants to 
                                                                                                                               
 29. Id. at 532–33. 
 30. Id. at 533. 
 31. 542 U.S. 466, 483 n.15 (2004) (detainees “have been held in executive detention for more than two 
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without access to counsel and without being charged with any wrongdoing”). 
 32. Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, supra note 27, at 534 n.7. 
 33. Response of the United States to Request for Precautionary Measures—Detainees at Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba (Apr. 15, 2002) (on file with author). 
 34. Id. at 21. 
 35. HELEN DUFFY, THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’ AND THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 299 (2005). 
 36. GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 24 
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11 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 29 (2012) 
40 
kill and wound each other without penalty; what would be a crime in peacetime is permitted 
in war.37 One of the most curious things about the prosecution of Omar Khadr, and one of the 
questions most often asked, was how Omar could be prosecuted for allegedly killing a soldier 
during battle where the combatant’s privilege should apply. That would be true, military 
commission prosecutors argued, if one were a legitimate combatant, but Omar and his fellow 
detainees were first defined as “enemy combatants,” and later, under the Obama 
Administration, as the aforementioned “alien unprivileged enemy belligerents,” thus 
stripping them, so the government argued, of the combatant’s privilege. It was originally this 
designation that came into controversy as the justification for holding U.S. detainees 
indefinitely, outside of a war zone, and subject to “enhanced” interrogation techniques that 
included repeated waterboarding. These were not soldiers entitled to prisoner of war (POW) 
status, according to the government, but terrorists who would be “treated humanely and, to 
the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the 
principles of the Geneva Convention.”38 That gaping exception for military necessity has 
created no end of legal problems for both the detainees and successive presidential 
administrations in Washington. 
Whatever the nuance added by this novel classification, the charge of murder of a U.S. 
soldier during combat as a war crime allegedly committed by an unlawful child combatant 
tested its limits.39 Such was the core basis of the Khadr prosecution. Lt. Col. David Frakt, 
who served as lead defense counsel in other military commission proceedings and now 
teaches law, argued successfully in at least two commission cases that the classification of 
“enemy combatant” itself “conflated two different concepts—unprivileged belligerents and 
war criminals.”40 He argues that: 
Under Article 4 of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention it is clear that while a 
member of an organized resistance movement or militia may be an unprivileged 
belligerent (because of not wearing a uniform or failing to carry arms openly, for 
example) he may still comply with the laws and customs of war, so not all hostile acts 
committed by unprivileged belligerents are war crimes. Attacks by unprivileged 
belligerents which comply with the law of war (in that they attack lawful military 
targets with lawful weapons) may only be tried in domestic courts. In Iraq, for example, 
insurgents who try to kill Americans by implanting roadside bombs are properly 
arrested and tried before the Central Criminal Court of Iraq as common criminals. 
Attacks by unprivileged belligerents which violate the law of war, such as attacks on 
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 38. Brian D. Tittemore, Guantanamo Bay and the Precautionary Measures of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights: A Case for International Oversight in the Struggle against 
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review articles on the notion of the combatant’s privilege in domestic and international armed 
conflict. I will instead focus more particularly on the issue of the Guantanamo detainees’ ages. 
 40. David Frakt, New Manual for Military Commissions Disregards the Commander-in-Chief, 
Congressional Intent and the Laws of War, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 29, 2010, 6:23 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-frakt/new-manual-for-military-c_b_557720.html. The two 
commission cases mentioned involved Mohamed Jawad, discussed in this Article, and Ali Hamza al 
Bahlul. David J.R. Frakt, Associate Professor of Law, BARRY UNIVERSITY ANDREAS SCHOOL OF LAW, 
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civilians or soldiers attempting to surrender, or using prohibited weapons like poison 
gas, can be tried in a war crimes tribunal.41 
In her report on the Khadr guilty plea, the NGO activist lawyer Andrea Prasow put it 
more succinctly: “It’s a novel legal argument: Merely engaging in battle as an insurgent 
rather than as a member of a regular army has never made such battlefield conduct a war 
crime.”42 One commentator, Professor David Glazier, a career Naval officer himself, believed 
that all five charges brought against Omar in the military commission were spurious under a 
strict analysis of the law of war.43 
A definitive review of these charges, however, will never occur due to Omar’s guilty plea, 
which waived his rights to review. Even had there been such an appeal, it is not likely to have 
settled the question. 
This unique and novel issue was only one of myriad issues in the context of international 
humanitarian law that arose for all detainees, not just children. Those issues included the 
legitimacy of new tribunals created from whole cloth after 9/11, primarily Combat Status 
Review Tribunals, which were used to determine detainee status in Guantanamo, and 
military commissions with their attendant appellate review mechanisms or lack thereof. The 
U.S. Supreme Court, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, found that the military commission scheme set 
up by the executive branch as of 2006 (and under which Omar was first charged), violated one 
of the core provisions of international humanitarian law as read through U.S. military law, 
that of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which requires “a regularly constituted 
court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized 
peoples.”44  
The message of Hamdan was not lost on the Bush Administration. Although not 
addressed in that decision, the same Common Article 3 also extends protection to all persons 
from “cruel treatment and torture; [and] outrages upon personal dignity, in particular 
humiliating and degrading treatment.”45 It was the mistreatment of detainees, first at Abu 
Ghraib and then at Guantanamo, that outraged the world and turned public opinion against 
Bush-era anti-terrorism policies. More than trials of terrorists, it was the risk of loss of 
evidence obtained through torture in court, as well as possible prosecution of interrogators for 
their abusive treatment of detainees, that drove the Bush Administration, immediately after 
                                                                                                                               
 41. Frakt, supra note 40. Professor Frakt developed this argument more fully in a law review article in 
which he discusses the misguided prosecution of Omar Khadr for war crimes. David J.R. Frakt, 
Direct Participation in Hostilities as a War Crime: America’s Failed Efforts to Change the Law of 
War, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 729, 752–55 (2012) (discussing the Khadr case). 
 42. Andrea Prasow, The Child Soldier on Trial at Guantanamo, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 27, 2010), 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/10/27/child-soldier-trial-guantanmo. 
 43. David Glazier, A Court without Jurisdiction: A Critical Assessment of the Military Commission 
Charges against Omar Khadr 2 (Loyola of L.A. Law Sch., Legal Studies Paper No. 2010-37, 2010), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1669946. 
 44. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630 (2006) (quoting the Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3320). More precisely, the Court found 
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of war by reference, thereby allowing for the application of Common Article 3. Id. at 598. 
 45. The text of Common Article 3, as its name implies, is shared by all four of the Geneva Conventions. 
See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 
art. 3(1)(a), (c). 
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the Hamdan decision, to seek quick passage by a Republican-controlled Congress of the 
Military Commissions Act of 2006. 
At bottom, international humanitarian law has had little to do with what happens to 
detainees at Guantanamo Bay. For a tiny handful of the nearly eight hundred men detained 
there over time, a conviction by plea or trial has ironically been the key to their release from 
the Cuban prison, as is the case with Omar Khadr.46 For another small group, death, by 
suicide or for other reasons, provided the only way out. For the vast majority, release by 
repatriation or transfer to a third country came at the absolute discretion of the United States 
government. Such appears to be the case for the remaining detainees, as not a single court 
decision ordering the release of a detainee via habeas corpus litigation in the federal courts 
has resulted in transfer from Guantanamo on those grounds. One can assume, however, that 
the nearly six hundred transfers carried out by two presidential administrations are in part 
the result of the legal pressure asserted by the habeas litigation. 
C. The Law: Children in Armed Conflict 
International law with regard to the rights of children is quite extensive, as will be further 
developed below, but comes primarily from two treaty sources that are most relevant here. 
The first is the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which has been ratified by every 
country of the world save the United States and Somalia. It defines a child as anyone below 
the age of eighteen.47 Two articles of the CRC deal with children in armed conflict. Article 38 
calls on states parties to refrain from recruiting children under the age of fifteen for military 
service, or using children under fifteen directly in hostilities.48 If between fifteen and 
eighteen, states are called on to give priority to recruitment of the oldest first. The article 
explicitly calls on states parties to “respect and to ensure respect for rules of international 
humanitarian law applicable to [the child] in armed conflicts.”49 As such, Article 38 is a kind 
of “hybrid” article: it is “clearly an [International Humanitarian Law] provision. Yet formally 
speaking, Article 38 is part of a human rights instrument.”50 Article 39 of the CRC states that 
the “States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to promote physical and psychological 
recovery and social reintegration of a child victim of . . . armed conflict.”51 Another article 
deals with children deprived of their liberty: Article 37 calls on states parties to keep detained 
children separated from adults “unless it is considered in the child’s best interest not to do 
so.”52 It further requires the right to outside communication with family and to legal 
assistance.53 
This framework is further developed in the Optional Protocols to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (“Protocol on Child 
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 47. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 1, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC]. 
 48. Id. art. 38. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Fiona Ang, Article 38: Children in Armed Conflicts, in A COMMENTARY ON THE UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 9 (André Alen et al. eds., 2005) (citation omitted). 
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Soldiers” or “Optional Protocol”).54 The Optional Protocol, formally ratified by the United 
States on December 23, 2002, raises the age of recruitment and direct participation of 
children from fifteen to eighteen, bringing it in line with the broad definition of juvenile 
status in the CRC (and most U.S. states).55 Most importantly for purposes of the discussion 
here, the Optional Protocol, in Article 6(3), provides that 
States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons within their 
jurisdiction recruited or used in hostilities contrary to this Protocol are demobilized or 
otherwise released from service. States Parties shall, when necessary, accord to these 
persons all appropriate assistance for their physical and psychological recovery and 
their social reintegration.56 
Article 7(1) further provides that the “States Parties shall cooperate in the implementation 
of the present Protocol, including in the prevention of any activity contrary to the Protocol 
and in the rehabilitation and social reintegration of persons who are victims of acts contrary 
to this Protocol.”57 
Additional international humanitarian law is applicable to Omar’s situation, including 
Article 77 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (Protocol I), which deals 
explicitly with children in international armed conflicts.58 Again, however, the United States 
has not ratified Protocol I, which means that most of the arguments made on behalf of 
children at Guantanamo were efforts to bring the norms within the ambit of customary 
international law.59 Moreover, Article 77 uses “under fifteen” language in referring to 
children, which is not helpful to Omar Khadr, who was captured at age fifteen.60 Many 
activists push for the “Straight 18” position, which would bar recruitment or use of all child 
soldiers under the age of 18. Indeed, Professor Drumbl has noted that “international law’s 
trend-line arcs toward the Straight 18 horizon.”61 
Two well-known and respected sets of non-binding principles also apply to children in 
situations of armed conflict: UNICEF’s Cape Town Principles of 1997,62 and a sequel, the 
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Paris Principles and Commitments of 2007.63 Both sets of principles adopt the “Straight 18” 
position. Finally, although not explicitly related to children in armed conflict, the United 
States Supreme Court has repeatedly invoked concepts from neuroscience on the cognitive 
development of children in decisions mitigating punishment and protecting the rights of 
children, including the decision excerpted in the heading to this Article.64 Those decisions 
employ the same underlying rationale regarding the reasons not to hold juvenile soldiers to 
the same standards as adults. 
D. Other Children in U.S. Detention at Guantanamo and Elsewhere 
The exact number of children detained at Guantanamo has yet to be fully clarified. Totals 
have ranged from as few as six to over sixty—the former number coming from the 
government and the latter from the activist world.65 One reliable count appears to be that 
compiled by journalist Andy Worthington, who documents up to twenty-eight juvenile 
detainees at Guantanamo based on materials posted to Wikileaks.66 The Worthington data 
show that most of the youthful detainees were transferred back to their home countries, one 
juvenile detainee died at Guantanamo “under mysterious circumstances” suggestive of 
suicide, and two (other than Omar Khadr) have been the subject of judicial proceedings 
described in more detail below.67 
In 2003, there was a storm of controversy and publicity over the discovery that there were 
at least three other children on the base. Omar Khadr was not included in that count.68 The 
press conference with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, excerpted in one of the 
headnotes to this Article, arose in the wake of that discovery. The children in question, 
thought to be between thirteen and fifteen, were quickly removed from the adult population 
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and relocated to Camp Iguana, part of the detention complex of buildings, where they enjoyed 
relative freedom and more comfortable conditions pending their transfer home. The boys were 
quietly returned to their homes in Afghanistan in early 2004.69 The extensive attention by 
the media to the detention of children, as well as the after-the-fact hushed responses by the 
government, suggest that officials knew that the detention of children at all, let alone with 
adults, was improper, if not illegal. 
Two judicial resolutions other than the Khadr case dealt with juveniles held at 
Guantanamo, one from the federal courts and one from a military commission. The first, El 
Gharani v. Bush,70 was quite simple and straightforward. Mohammed el Gharani, a native of 
Saudi Arabia and citizen of Chad, was captured by Pakistanis and turned over to the United 
States in early 2002. El Gharani sought his release via habeas corpus petition to U.S. District 
Court judge Richard Leon. Age was not a factor in Judge Leon’s decision to order el Gharani’s 
release, which turned on the sufficiency of the government’s evidence. The only mention of 
juvenile status at the time of capture came in a single line of the decision, stating that the 
petitioner “claims to have traveled to Pakistan from Saudi Arabia at the age of 14 to escape 
discrimination against Chadians in that country.”71 Age may have played a role in the judge’s 
analysis, but not on the record. The boy was released from Guantanamo in June of 2009.72 
The other decision involved a detainee named Mohamed Jawad. Jawad was arrested in 
2002 for allegedly throwing a hand grenade into a vehicle carrying two U.S. military 
personnel and their interpreter in Afghanistan, resulting in serious injuries to all. While his 
exact age at the time of his arrest is unclear, the government admitted he was under eighteen 
years old at the time of his detention.73 During interrogation by Afghan officials following his 
arrest, he was told that he and his family would be killed if he did not confess. He confessed 
to the crime and was turned over to the U.S. military, which transferred him to Guantanamo 
and charged him with various crimes to be tried by military commission.74 The presiding 
officer denied a motion to dismiss charges based on the accused’s status as a child soldier, but 
that motion was grounded almost entirely in domestic law.75 The presiding officer did, 
however, grant a motion to suppress Jawad’s statements to Afghan authorities, finding the 
threat to kill his family “credible,” and further concluding that the threats and intimidation 
amounted to torture, given “the Accused’s age and the then reputation of the Afghan police as 
corrupt and violent.”76 Undeterred, the government decided to proceed with the case, only to 
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lose a challenge to Jawad’s detention via habeas corpus in the federal district court of 
Washington, D.C.77 Charges against Jawad eventually were dropped, and he was repatriated 
to Afghanistan in August of 2009.78 Age played a clear role in the decision by the presiding 
officer to suppress Jawad’s statements; there is little doubt that age played a role in 
Mohamed Jawad’s success in pursuing habeas corpus relief, as well as in his eventual release. 
Skirmishing in the case over disclosure of favorable evidence to the defense gave rise to the 
resignation of the chief military prosecutor, Lt. Col. Darrell L. Vandeveld, whose eloquent 
statement of personal moral convictions is excerpted as another headnote to this paper.79 
The U.S. detention of juveniles in armed conflicts is not unique to Guantanamo. In answer 
to a written question from the Committee on the Rights of the Child in June of 2008 about 
how many juveniles were detained at Guantanamo and other U.S. detention facilities, the 
government responded that it “does not currently detain any juveniles at Guantanamo Bay;” 
but that it had held ninety juveniles in Afghanistan (ten currently), and had held 
approximately 2400 juveniles in Iraq (500 currently).80 
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E. Children as Defendants in War Crimes Trials in History81 
Many statements were made in the media and elsewhere in the pre-trial stages of the 
Khadr commission proceedings regarding this historical trial of a child for war crimes. Most 
typical were dramatic assertions that Omar’s trial would be the first such trial in modern 
history, or since World War II, or ever.82 This brief subsection includes information on the 
detention or trials of children in armed conflict in history and refutes the contentions 
regarding the unprecedented nature of the Khadr trial while affirming that no prior history 
justifies U.S. judicial action against him. 
Children have been a part of armed conflicts throughout much of American history before 
the Twentieth Century. Regulations of the U.S. Army in 1813 specified that “healthy, active 
boys between the ages of 14 and 18 could be enlisted as musicians with parental consent.”83 
Boy soldiers served as musicians, cooks, messengers, porters, spies, and sometimes as 
fighters during the U.S. Civil War, where boys in uniform ranged in age from eight to 
sixteen.84 Boys of fourteen and above were routinely permitted to serve or actively recruited 
into the Confederate army, particularly as the war ground on into 1864 and the South’s 
position became more desperate.85 Some children were detained as prisoners of war on both 
sides. One well-known boy prisoner of thirteen or fourteen at Andersonville, the South’s most 
infamous prison, was called “Red Cap” and became a personal aide to the camp’s commander, 
Henry Wirz.86 In prisons of the North, such as Fort Delaware, boys of sixteen foraged for food, 
contracted measles, and sometimes died of congestion of the lungs and other diseases.87 The 
boys were sometimes the subject of legal action, but never prosecuted themselves. These were 
habeas corpus applications, said to have “inundated” the courts, filed by parents seeking to 
gain the release of their sons from military service.88 
In the American West during the Civil War, a military commission tried nearly 400 
Dakota Indians for their actions against white settlers in Minnesota. Carol Chomsky 
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documents these trials,89 while another scholar of the commission proceedings records the 
trial and conviction of several Dakota Indian boys between fourteen and eighteen, where at 
least one fourteen-year-old boy was hanged.90 The trial of Wowinape, a boy of sixteen, was 
one of the most curious. He was convicted by the commission and sentenced to hang, but his 
sentence was later overturned by a superior officer. Professor Chomsky suggests that the 
overturning of the sentence may well have had to do with Wowinape’s age and the fact that 
he “had done no more than fight in battles.”91 
Children were the subjects of wartime trials in World War II, although the evidence as to 
whether these were trials for war crimes is ambiguous. While some partisans fighting in 
Europe were children, young boys became part of the fighting forces of Germany, particularly 
in the Hitler Youth and Volkssturm, literally People’s Storm, a militia that drafted children 
as young as ten during 1945, the last year of the war.92 Starting in January of 1943, anti-
aircraft batteries were manned by Hitler Youth of age fifteen.93 One Hitler Youth operation 
involved dropping boy suicide commandos behind enemy lines in occupied Germany to 
reverse Allied gains there.94 Two “Werewolves,” as they were known, were captured behind 
American lines. Heinz Petry, sixteen, and Josef Schörner, seventeen, were tried as spies by 
the American troops, condemned to death and executed.95 
During Guantanamo commission proceedings on the motion to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction over juveniles, to be fully discussed below, the defense asserted in its motion that 
“no international criminal tribunal established under the laws of war, from Nuremberg 
forward, has ever prosecuted former child soldiers as war criminals.”96 The prosecution 
responded by citing three cases purporting to prosecute children for war crimes during or 
after World War II.97 The prosecution cited the Trial of Johannes Oenning & Emil Nix98 by a 
British Military Court in Borken, Germany. Oenning, said to be a fifteen-year-old member of 
the Hitler Youth, was tried for his involvement in the murder of a Royal Air Force Officer. 
The prosecution also cited Trial of Alois & Anna Bommer & and Their Daughters,99 where 
the Permanent Military Tribunal at Metz, Germany tried two daughters under eighteen, who 
were convicted with another sister and their parents for war crimes. The two daughters were 
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imprisoned. Finally, the prosecution referred to an article citing the war crimes trial of Josef 
Kramer and others, known as the Belsen case.100 There, one of the accused was said to be 
Antoni Aurdzieg, who was “as young as 16 at the time of his vicious offenses.”101 
The defense responded that a trial transcript in the Belson case showed that Aurdzieg was 
twenty years old, not sixteen; that the two Bommer daughters and their remaining family 
were tried under the French Penal Code; and that Oenning was tried by a British occupation 
commission, not a law-of-war commission, as with Omar Khadr.102 They might also have 
noted that all of these World War II proceedings took place before adoption of the now-
universally respected Geneva Conventions regime of 1949. The presiding judge made no 
mention of any of these historic cases in his decision on the defense motion.103 
There is, however, one troubling modern case that was not mentioned in the Khadr 
litigation or anywhere else, to the best of the author’s knowledge. It involves the trial and 
conviction of a boy of fourteen at the time of his offenses by a special U.N.-administered court 
in East Timor. In 2000, the U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) 
created the Special Court for East Timor, Indonesia, which heard cases brought by the 
Serious Crimes Unit (SCU) against persons responsible for crimes against humanity and 
other serious crimes committed in East Timor. The Special Court’s composition was one East 
Timorese and two international judges.104 The Rules of Procedure of the tribunals allowed the 
prosecution of minors between twelve and sixteen years of age, if done in accordance with 
special rules relating to juvenile justice.105 
A young boy identified in the file only as “X” to protect his privacy and reputation, was 
arrested in October 2001, and was later charged by the SCU with extermination and 
attempted extermination, both crimes against humanity under the terms of the Special 
Tribunal. The facts, though somewhat scant, indicate that X made a statement to police that 
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he had been forced to join a militia in September of 1999 at age fourteen. He had traveled 
with the militia into West Timor, where they found seventy-five young men tied up as 
prisoners. After a forced march of the prisoners, supervised by adult leaders of the militia, he 
was ordered to kill three prisoners and then beaten when he did not comply promptly. He 
admitted to having killed three men with a machete; forty-seven men in total were killed by 
the militia that night. After these events, X left and went home.106 
The record of the case indicates that X “pleaded guilty to murder under article 338 of the 
Indonesian Penal Code” in October 2002.107 X was later sentenced to twelve months 
imprisonment, with credit for eleven months served in pretrial confinement, and the 
remaining month suspended.108 The report on the trial notes the lenience of the panel, 
showing that “it had taken into account not only the age of the accused but also the fact the 
accused did not act out of his/hers own initiative.”109 The actual judgment in the case also 
notes as mitigating factors that the actions were taken pursuant to superior orders, the lack 
of a criminal record, and the plea of guilty. The judgment text itself makes it clearer that the 
charge to which X pleaded guilty was the domestic crime of manslaughter, a lesser degree of 
homicide than murder, with a less severe punishment range.110 In October of 2002, the boy 
was released from custody so that he might attend school.111 
The case is troubling because it was completed quite recently, and under the auspices of 
the U.N., which purportedly seeks to limit the prosecution of minors. Moreover, the original 
charge was crimes against humanity, an international crime. On the other hand, the sentence 
imposed recognized the age of the accused, and was for a common crime in domestic law, not 
a war crime. 
Suffice it to say that from World War II onward, war crimes trials of juveniles were and 
are certainly the rare exception, particularly given the estimated numbers of child soldiers 
worldwide. In the Sierra Leone Special Tribunal, the chief prosecutor announced that he 
would not prosecute juveniles.112 In the Statute of the International Criminal Court, no one 
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under eighteen years of age can be prosecuted at all.113 And in 2006, a U.N. Special 
Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 
recommended that “in no case . . . should minors [under the age of 18] be placed under the 
jurisdiction of military courts.”114 The historical trend is away from the prosecution of 
children in armed conflict. Countries that honor the spirit of the Optional Protocol on Child 
Soldiers will either not prosecute children under eighteen, or will prosecute with protections 
commensurate with international norms of juvenile justice, taking into account the age of the 
alleged offender. 
II.  Omar Khadr as a Child in the Federal Courts: Habeas Corpus 
Challenges 
In June of 2004, the United States Supreme Court held, in Rasul v. Bush, that the federal 
courts had jurisdiction to hear the claims of detainees at Guantanamo Bay via the writ of 
habeas corpus, and that venue would lie in Washington, D.C.115 Within days of that decision, 
I requested a case from the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR), a dynamic non-
governmental group in New York that had been collecting claims from the families of 
detainees. I was joined in representation by another clinical faculty colleague, with plans to 
manage the case as part of our docket in the International Human Rights Law Clinic. CCR 
happily assigned us the Omar Khadr case, to be handled on a purely pro bono basis, but with 
coordination and backup to be provided by CCR staff.116 
Nothing in the litigation of the federal district court claims by detainees was easy; the 
government, through both the Department of Justice and the Pentagon, fought against access 
to the courts for the detainees and their lawyers on every conceivable issue, every step of the 
way, even after the Supreme Court’s seemingly clear decision. One initial administrative step 
was the government’s effort to consolidate the pending habeas cases, then numbering only 
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eleven, for disposition of common issues. That effort was successful, although individual 
district court judges had the authority either to pull their cases off of the common docket for 
their own disposition, or to hear individual petitions for relief on discrete issues. Our team 
therefore proceeded on two fronts in federal court, one chosen and one mandated: we litigated 
two discrete and particular matters before our assigned judge, John Bates, while our common 
claims were heard, on common briefing, by Joyce Hens Green, who stepped out of senior 
status to hear this single matter. 
Almost immediately after our assignment of the case, I began research on the issue of 
children in armed conflict, with particular focus on two self-executing treaties ratified by the 
United States: the Optional Protocol on Child Soldiers and the International Labor 
Organization’s Convention 182, Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the 
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (“ILO Convention 182” or “Child Labor 
Convention”). Among the many issues that we prepared to litigate, the issue of Omar’s status 
as a child in armed conflict was high on the list. Our amended petition for relief through 
habeas corpus incorporated both an initial allegation regarding the absence of jurisdiction in 
Guantanamo over minors, as well as a subsequent allegation that Omar’s detention was 
unlawful and arbitrary under international humanitarian and human rights law protecting 
juveniles.117 However, the opportunities for raising such claims, we soon discovered, were 
often overshadowed by broader or seemingly more urgent issues. 
Judge Green’s consolidated case gave us one of the earliest opportunities to hear the 
government’s position on Omar’s status as a child. The judge ordered a large pre-hearing 
conference meeting of all counsel in her chambers in late August of 2004, within weeks of the 
consolidation order. At that meeting, we noted that our client was a child, detained at age 
fifteen. Judge Green professed surprise to hear this and asked the government to provide her 
with information regarding the situation of minors at Guantanamo and any steps that had 
been taken to provide them with special accommodations. We followed up with a letter to 
government counsel that day, and received their reply on September 3, 2004.118 The letter 
indicated that as of that date, “no detainees known to be younger than age 16 are detained at 
Guantanamo Bay,”119 a statement crafted to focus on current age rather than age at the time 
of initial capture or detention. The letter also said that the government’s policy was to provide 
special treatment to detainees under the age of sixteen at the time of their arrival, pointing to 
the three Afghan juveniles who had been moved into the comforts of Camp Iguana and later 
released after the international press discovered their presence there. Again, however, the 
letter failed to note that detainees sixteen and older were treated as adults for purposes of 
status and treatment, particularly for protracted and “enhanced” interrogations. Moreover, 
the letter ironically referred to international law only to defend government policy while 
aggressively pursuing a bar to detainees from invoking humanitarian law in their defense.  
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The letter stated that 
the law of armed conflict does not define with precision the age at which a combatant is 
considered a child or adult. Generally accepted norms in the field, including the Geneva 
Conventions and other international protocols to which the United States is a party, 
while not specifically addressing the issue of combatants who are minors, recognize that 
during a time of war civilians and individuals under the age of 15 are accorded different 
treatment than persons who are older.120 
We responded immediately to their letter on each of these issues, pointing out that the 
government had implied recognition of its obligations under the Protocol on Child Soldiers, 
which Congress had explicitly made self-executing,121 and that the primary purpose of the 
Protocol was rehabilitation and reintegration into society of children in armed conflict.122 
Similarly, ILO Convention 182, also self-executing, defines children as anyone under 
eighteen, and in its Article 4, condemns “the forced or compulsory recruitment of children for 
use in armed conflict” as a form of forced labor.123 By signing the treaty, the United States 
had shown its repugnance of all mistreatment of children in armed conflict. 
We received no response from the court to this exchange of correspondence. We attempted 
to raise the issue of Omar’s status as a child in armed conflict again in briefing on the issue of 
the government’s motion to dismiss all detainee claims. Unfortunately, however, our one 
child’s claims were overwhelmed by the common claims of all of the detainees jointly, which 
were briefed with a specific page limit. Our reiterated claims under the Protocol and ILO 
Convention 182 were relegated to a single footnote in a section arguing that international law 
claims could be vindicated by habeas corpus.124 
Judge Green’s decision in In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, on January 31, 2005, 
generally upheld the detainee’s right to proceed on habeas corpus grounds.125 It made 
national and international news and eventually, after winding, protracted appeals and 
joinder of other cases, became part of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2006 ruling in Boumediene v. 
Bush.126 With this generally good news from Judge Green, however, came bad news for Omar 
Khadr. First, in a little-noted paragraph toward the end of a long opinion, Judge Green 
dismissed without discussion “the remaining treaty-based claims” other than her narrow 
holding with regard to the application of the Geneva Conventions, and declined to reach 
                                                                                                                               
 120. Id. 
 121. In his message of transmittal of the Optional Protocol to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
President Clinton concluded that “[n]o implementing legislation would be required with respect to 
U.S. ratification of the Children in Armed Conflict Protocol.” Message from the President of the 
United States Transmitting Two Optional Protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, S. 
TREATY DOC. NO. 106-37, at VI (2000). The Senate hearings on the treaty echoed this conclusion: 
“No changes in U.S. law will be required to fulfill the obligations of the Protocol.” Report from the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, EXEC. RPT. 107-4, at 4 (2002). 
 122. Letter from Richard J. Wilson & Muneer I. Ahmad, Counsel for Omar Khadr, to the Hon. Joyce 
Hens Green (Sept. 7, 2004). 
 123. International Labour Organization, Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action 
for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, art. 4, June 17, 1999, Convention No. 182. 
 124. Petitioner’s Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss at 25 n.21, In re 
Guantanamo Detainee Cases, Nos. 02-CV-0299 et al., (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2004), 2004 WL 5225829. 
 125. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443 (D.D.C. 2005). 
 126. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
11 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 29 (2012) 
54 
claims under customary international law, as “unnecessary . . . to resolve the petitioners’ 
claims.”127 We thus were denied that forum to reach the issue of Omar’s status as a child in 
armed conflict. Second, Judge Green almost immediately imposed a stay regarding any 
further action by the detainees during the protracted process of appellate review of her 
decision,128 thereby frustrating our desire for speedy review of the issue. 
During those early stages of the litigation, and despite the stay, we pursued two separate 
claims for relief on Omar’s behalf under habeas jurisdiction, filed before federal District Judge 
John Bates. Both proceeded as cases involving minors, thus using Omar’s initials “O.K.” as 
his only designation in court filings, despite widespread and growing attention to his case in 
the media. Both claims were decided against us, and no appeals were pursued. 
The first action was a motion for emergency medical access and for production of medical 
records, filed on August 10, 2004.129 Though cast as “emergency,” the motion lingered on the 
judge’s docket for more than two months, and was resolved against Omar in a decision which 
addressed itself largely to issues of his mental competence to stand trial, an issue we had 
neither raised nor briefed.130 At the end of the decision, Judge Bates wrote that the case may 
be read to raise a “broader and more sweeping claim,” one regarding the court’s “affirmative 
responsibility to ensure the physical and mental well-being of petitioner, in light of his status 
as a minor, his serious physical injuries, [and] the views of many that conditions at 
Guantanamo are too harsh (and inappropriate for juveniles).”131 While we had focused 
heavily on Omar’s status as a minor as a factor justifying judicial intervention for his 
protection, we had not raised the claim in those broad terms. The court nonetheless rejected 
those arguments as well, expressing a reluctance to “second-guess the medical treatment 
provided to prisoners by government officials.”132 Finally, in perhaps its most disingenuous 
ruling, the court found that whatever relief might have been justified when he was a child, 
petitioner was “now an adult . . . seek[ing] only prospective relief in the form of a future 
medical assessment.”133 That reasoning ignored the simple fact that no detainee had been 
given access to counsel or the courts for up to three years, and that fact gathering in 
Guantanamo occurred in the most onerous conditions for counsel and client. If Omar was an 
adult, it was because of the government’s vigorous efforts to prevent advocacy on his behalf 
while he was still a child. 
The second action was filed in March of 2005, originally seeking injunctive relief to 
prevent ongoing torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment during 
interrogations, and later amended by a similar claim seeking to prevent Omar’s possible 
rendition from Guantanamo to another country without judicial approval.134 This action 
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faced the additional hurdle of Judge Green’s stay in the case: it sought to lift the stay due to 
extraordinary circumstances. It too failed. Again, we did not explicitly challenge Omar’s 
status as a juvenile in that proceeding. We invoked provisions of the Convention against 
Torture, which the United States had ratified and implemented,135 as well as those of Article 
77(1) of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, which provides that “[c]hildren shall be the 
object of special respect and shall be protected against any form of indecent assault. The 
Parties to the conflict shall provide them with the care and aid they require, whether because 
of their age or for any other reason.”136 
In a July decision that year, Judge Bates again rejected our arguments seeking 
intervention, concluding that we had shown no real and immediate threat of future 
mistreatment similar to that which had occurred previously.137 The ruling was conspicuously 
devoid of any mention of or reliance on international law. The court found that “the fact that 
the petitioner was a minor when many of the alleged incidents occurred does not change this 
analysis. His status as a minor does not make the allegations of mistreatment any more 
likely to occur again in the future.”138 Judge Bates also reiterated his earlier holding that the 
relief requested was prospective only and thus not available to Omar as an adult.139 
Judge Bates was to have one more opportunity to directly address the issue of Omar’s 
status as a child affected by armed conflict, although not during our representation of him. In 
2008, Omar’s newly appointed military lawyers simultaneously sought to dismiss charges 
before a reconstituted military commission on grounds of Omar’s juvenile status while also 
seeking to enjoin those proceedings in the federal court habeas process, on grounds that his 
trial was barred due to his status as a juvenile, or alternatively that he be transferred from 
adult to juvenile detention and placed in an appropriate rehabilitation and reintegration 
program.140 Once again, Omar’s lawyers failed to persuade Judge Bates, although this time 
he avoided the questions rather than answering them adversely to the petitioner. 
Omar’s legal team made three arguments. First, they argued that the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006, enacted quickly by Congress after the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
Hamdan decision, did “not confer personal jurisdiction” for the trial of juveniles.141 Second, 
they argued that Omar’s designation as an “enemy combatant” was inconsistent with U.S. 
and international law, as a child cannot be a “member,” “affiliate” or “associate” of an armed 
                                                                                                                               
 135. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
Apr. 18, 1988, 1988 U.S.T. 202, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
 136. Protocol I, supra note 58, art. 77. We argued that the U.S. government had accepted the language of 
Article 77 as expressive of customary international law. In general, however, we stayed away from 
the Protocol’s otherwise helpful language, in part because Article 77’s provisions conspicuously 
apply to those under the age of fifteen, and our client was captured at age fifteen. At least one noted 
scholar argues that Article 77 cannot be said to establish a minimum age of fifteen for war crimes 
responsibility, as an “unwarranted” reading of the provision. HAPPOLD, supra note 59, at 144. 
Instead, he argues that the benefits of Article 77 “accrue to all children, that is, all persons below 18 
years of age.” Id.at 104. 
 137. O.K. v. Bush, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 113–15. 
 138. Id. at 114 n.12. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Khadr v. Bush, 587 F. Supp. 2d 225, 229–30 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 141. Id. at 229. 
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group.142 Third, they argued that even if his detention was lawful, “the law of war require[d] 
that [Omar] be placed in a rehabilitation and reintegration program appropriate for former 
child soldiers.”143 The last claim was grounded primarily in the language of the Protocol on 
Child Soldiers.144 
Judge Bates largely adopted the arguments of the government. He abstained on the first 
two questions and found that he was statutorily prohibited from deciding the third. He found 
that the pending proceedings in a military commission had priority over his review of the first 
two issues, and that those remedies must be exhausted before he could validly consider 
them.145 As to the third issue, he found that he had no jurisdiction to hear such claims 
pursuant to provisions of the Military Commissions Act that barred review by the courts.146 
This last conclusion seems the most problematic. While the court found that this request 
“comes closer to implicating the core of the writ than does a request for a blanket and a 
mattress,” it still essentially constituted “a request for an on base transfer to a less restrictive 
detention facility.”147 When characterized as a challenge to conditions of confinement, the 
claim fell within the ambit of a provision of the new law that barred federal court review of 
such claims. Moreover, the court’s invocation of “conditions of confinement” neatly allowed it 
to avoid any issue of treaty interpretation or, more generally, of international law at all.148 
If a claim for transfer into rehabilitation under the Protocol on Child Soldiers constitutes a 
mere claim for change of conditions of confinement, the treaty is rendered meaningless as to 
its core purpose. Treatment of juveniles within the U.S. legal system provides a useful 
analogy. If a crime is committed by a minor, whatever the state or federal law defining the 
age for such persons, the child is treated as a juvenile offender, subject to an entirely different 
regime of adjudication and punishment.149 While the child may be transferred into adult 
jurisdiction, that transfer requires a judicial determination changing the status of the minor 
from child to adult for purposes of jurisdiction.150 Thus, a transfer from juvenile to adult 
confinement is not only a change in condition, but a change in status. It is the nature of the 
claimant, not the nature of the claim, which defines the transition. The same should have 
been true in the determination to treat Omar Khadr as a juvenile for purposes of the Protocol. 
In any event, no appeal was taken from Judge Bates’ decision. But Omar Khadr’s long saga 
for vindication of his rights as a child was not over. He also raised such claims in military 
commission proceedings. 
                                                                                                                               
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 229–30. 
 144. Id. at 237. 
 145. Id. at 230–34. 
 146. Id. at 234–38. 
 147. Id. at 237. 
 148. Id. 
 149. NICHOLAS BALA, YOUTH CRIMINAL JUSTICE LAW 1 (2003) (“Every legal system recognizes that 
children and youths are different from adults and should not be held accountable for violations of 
the criminal law in the same fashion as adults.”). 
 150. An amicus brief in the Khadr commission proceeding points out that “in every state in the [United 
States], juvenile offenders are submitted to adult prosecution only by express authorization.” 
Amicus Brief filed by Juvenile Law Center at 2, United States v. Khadr, (Jan. 18, 2008), available at 
http://www.mc.mil/CASES/MilitaryCommissions.aspx. 
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III. Omar Khadr as a Child in Military Commission Proceedings: 
 Pre-Trial Issues 
Military commission proceedings fundamentally change the posture of the defendant, the 
primary claimant of rights. The claim in habeas corpus proceedings is governed by civil rules, 
with lesser burdens of proof for the government to justify ongoing detention, whereas military 
commission proceedings are criminal in nature, and the accused should enjoy all the rights of 
a defendant, the most important of which are the presumption of innocence and the 
prosecution’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. However, as established at 
Guantanamo, these specialized military tribunals were explicitly designed to make it easier 
for the government to convict, and very hard for the defendant to invoke the normal 
guarantees of due process and fair trial.151 Such failures are exactly what led the United 
States Supreme Court, in the Hamdan decision, to strike down the commission system as 
fatally flawed. 
My faculty colleague and I, having represented Omar in federal court, continued to 
represent him as civilian counsel when he was charged in November of 2005 by the first 
military commission put into place by presidential order of George W. Bush.152 Under the 
rules of the commission as then constituted, all other actors in the proceedings—prosecution, 
judge and jury—were regular military personnel. The rules therefore required that, unlike 
courts martial, the accused was required to be represented by military lawyers. Civilian 
lawyers were optional at the election of the accused. Omar was provided with two military 
lawyers who collaborated with us until all commission proceedings were suspended after the 
Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the Hamdan case in the spring of 2006. 
The pre-trial proceedings in the first military commission process were abbreviated, 
lasting only a matter of months in our case before being stayed, but they merit mention as to 
the claims raised relating to the issue of children in armed conflict. Our defense team filed 
some forty-five pre-trial motions challenging the jurisdiction or process of the commissions; 
some were broad and some very narrow. The prosecution responded to those motions, but no 
hearing was ever held on their merits; the commissions were struck down before a decision by 
the presiding officer on any single motion. Four defense motions, numbers 32 through 35, 
dealt with the issues of children in armed conflict charged with war crimes. The simplest was 
Motion 35, which called for use of the initials of the accused only, given his youth at the time 
of the offenses. The motion would have been largely ineffectual, given the storm of media 
focus on any military commission proceedings at that time, and Omar Khadr’s name had 
been spread worldwide due to that enormous publicity. 
Motions 32 and 33 were similar in purpose: 32 called for dismissal of the charges based on 
failure of commission procedures to provide for defenses or sentencing procedures for 
                                                                                                                               
 151. I have written about this elsewhere, and will not dwell on the nature or process of military 
commissions, a subject worthy of extended treatment in itself. See Richard J. Wilson, Military 
Commissions in Guantánamo Bay: Giving “Full and Fair Trial” a Bad Name, 10 GONZ. J. INT’L L. 
63 (2006). 
 152. The charges were: conspiracy; murder by an unprivileged belligerent; attempted murder by an 
unprivileged belligerent; and aiding the enemy. United States v. Khadr (U.S. Ct. of Military 
Comm’n, Nov. 4, 2005), available at www.mc.mil/CASES/MilitaryCommissions.aspx. 
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juveniles under age eighteen at the time of their offenses, while 33 called for dismissal based 
on failure to prosecute Omar as a child at the time of his alleged offenses. Omar was nineteen 
years old at the time the motions were filed. The arguments were grounded first in 
international human rights law. The United States had ratified the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and had signed the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC), which obligated the United States, at the very least, not to violate the object and 
purpose of the treaty. Virtually worldwide ratification also arguably created obligations under 
customary international law,153 particularly because the United States had ratified the 
Optional Protocol on Child Soldiers. Both the ICCPR and CRC required special treatment for 
juveniles in general, and especially during criminal proceedings, where the goal of any 
adjudicatory process was to be rehabilitation and the best interests of the child. The complete 
failure of military commission procedures to acknowledge the special needs of juveniles 
rendered them deeply flawed as to any child charged there. 
The prosecution responded, in essence, that no international instrument prohibits the 
government from holding someone criminally responsible for war crimes solely because he 
was fifteen years old at the time of the offense in question. It further argued, as had the U.S. 
government in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, that international human 
rights law does not apply during armed conflict, as the more specific lex specialis of 
international humanitarian law takes over completely.154 
Motion 35 argued for dismissal on grounds that the commission process failed to meet 
obligations to decommission, rehabilitate and reintegrate Omar into society, as a former child 
solder. Here, for the first time in the commission process, we argued under the Protocol on 
Child Soldiers and ILO Convention 182 together with other international juvenile standards 
such as the Beijing Rules, the Tokyo Rules, and the Guidelines for Action on Children in the 
Criminal Justice System. We also invoked Article 78 of Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, 
arguing that Omar was not properly evacuated from the conflict zone in which he was 
captured. The prosecution’s argument can be summarized in a single sentence: none of the 
treaties or standards bar the United States from trying a fifteen-year-old for war crimes. 
They argued that the instruments invoked, save the Protocol on Child Soldiers, were either 
non-binding or not treaties to which the United States was a party. The Protocol, they 
argued, did not prohibit prosecution of fifteen-year-olds. 
The Protocol on Child Soldiers, in its Article 6(3), provides that states parties “shall take 
all feasible measures to ensure that persons within their jurisdiction recruited or used in 
                                                                                                                               
 153. Both the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Special Tribunal for Sierra Leone have 
found this to be the case. See Juridical Condition and Human Rights of the Child, Advisory Opinion 
OC-17/2002, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ¶ 29 (Aug. 28, 2002) [hereinafter OC-17/2002], available at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_17_ing.pdf (noting that the large number of CRC 
ratifications reflect international opinio iuris comunis); Appeals Chamber Decision on Preliminary 
Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment), Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga Norman, Case 
No. SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), ¶ 19, (Special Ct. for Sierra Leone May 31, 2004), available at 
http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=XSdlFGVsuTI%3d&tabid=193 (concluding that “the 
CRC became international customary law almost at the time of the entry into force of the 
Convention”). 
 154. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
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hostilities contrary to this Protocol are demobilized or otherwise released from service.”155 It 
goes on to require social reintegration for such persons. Two aspects of the Protocol are 
highlighted here: first, the obligations are mandatory (“shall”), not precatory; second, 
demobilization and reintegration are required when a child is under the physical control of 
the capturing state (“within their jurisdiction”). Article 7(1) again requires states to cooperate 
in implementation of the treaty: “States Parties shall cooperate in the implementation of the 
present Protocol, including . . . in the rehabilitation and social reintegration of persons who 
are victims of acts contrary to this Protocol.”156 The remainder of the treaty’s operative 
provisions refers only to persons less than eighteen years of age. There is no mention of trials 
for fifteen-year-old juveniles in the treaty, but the Protocol does contain language twice 
calling for measures to protect any juvenile “victim” under eighteen and “used in hostilities” 
other than by trial; that is, by rehabilitation and reintegration. But that issue, too, was left 
without resolution in the commission proceedings, which was struck down in its entirety in 
June. 
The issue of jurisdiction over children was finally settled for the military commission 
process by a ruling in April of 2008 on a defense motion arguing that the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006 (“MCA”) failed to provide jurisdiction for the trial of juvenile crimes 
by a child soldier.157 By this point in the commission process, the Khadr case had attracted 
heavy international attention, and amicus briefs were filed on his behalf by three groups of 
lawmakers, scholars and non-governmental organizations.158 All were admitted and 
considered by the presiding officer. The defense raised three arguments. First, Omar’s team 
argued that neither the MCA nor any other military law extends to those who do not have 
lawful military status, and children under eighteen, under U.S. law, are incapable of 
obtaining such lawful status. As authority, the defense invoked domestic cases barring the 
military enlistment of minors under eighteen who could never attain status as a member of 
the military. This argument was easily brushed aside, as the MCA refers to “persons” while 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”) refers to “members of the armed forces.” As 
such, the presiding officer reasoned, decisions under the UCMJ have no relevance to 
commission proceedings. A second argument related to the application of the federal Juvenile 
Detention Act to commission proceedings, and is not relevant to the discussion here. 
The third argument, however, was the heart of the matter. It again alleged that the 
Optional Protocol on Child Soldiers created state obligations similar to those raised in the 
first military commission proceeding, with additional detail on the applicable U.S. federal 
juvenile law. The presiding officer’s ruling, which denied the motion, is terse; it decides these 
important issues in less than three pages of analysis. As to international law, the presiding 
                                                                                                                               
 155. Optional Protocol, supra note 54, art. 6(3) (emphasis added). 
 156. Id. art. 7(1) (emphasis added). 
 157. Ruling on Defense Motion for Dismissal Due to Lack of Jurisdiction under the MCA in Regard to 
Juvenile Crimes of a Child Soldier (D-022), United States v. Khadr (Military Comm’n April 30, 
2008) [hereinafter Ruling on Motion to Dismiss—MCA Jurisdiction], available at 
http://www.mc.mil/CASES/MilitaryCommissions.aspx. 
 158. Amicus briefs included those from Sen. Robert Badiner et al. (French parliamentarian and criminal 
defense lawyer); Canadian parliamentarians and law professors, and foreign legal associations; and 
the Juvenile Law Center. Id. at 1. 
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officer found that “neither customary international law nor international treaties binding 
upon the United States prohibit the trial of a person for alleged violations of the law of 
nations committed when he was 15 years of age.”159 This is an issue that the defense had 
conceded in its reply,160 arguing instead that if prosecution was to proceed, it must be 
accompanied by protections of juveniles guaranteeing their rehabilitation and reintegration, 
and should be conducted under the domestic juvenile law. 
The decision is interesting in at least three other respects. First, both the defense and 
commission used the silence of Congress on the issue of the trial of juveniles in the MCA to 
advance their arguments or conclusions based on principles of statutory interpretation. The 
defense argued that nothing prevented Congress from providing for the prosecution of 
minors, and yet the MCA failed to provide for such prosecutions; Congressional silence was 
evidence that it did not wish trials of juveniles, so the argument went. While the presiding 
officer in the Khadr case did not address this issue, the officer in Jawad, another commission 
case involving a juvenile, did. The presiding officer there found that because “both 
Mohammed Jawad and Omar Khadr have been in U.S. custody at Guantanamo Bay since 
2002, a fact that Congress is aware of, Congress could have provided for an age requirement 
when enacting the [MCA] in 2006; it chose not to.”161 Generally, silence by Congress does not 
lend itself to easy statutory interpretation: not every silence is pregnant, as one authority 
argues.162 
A second aspect of the decision denying the motion to dismiss is its improper invocation of 
the “last in time” rule in U.S. law. The decision finds that even though the Protocol is the law 
of the land, the adoption of the MCA comes later, and “a federal statute, passed after the 
ratification of a treaty, prevails over contrary provisions of a treaty.”163 As authority for this 
assertion, the presiding officer cited to an 1889 Supreme Court decision in the Chinese 
Exclusion Cases.164 This may be true where, as cited, the provisions of the statute are 
contrary to the treaty, but if the two documents can be read together without conflict, courts 
should do so, according to the long-established rule of interpretation laid down in the 
Charming Betsy case.165 Here, the MCA is a general statute for the establishment of 
jurisdiction and rules of procedure. It is silent on the issue of the treatment of juveniles, while 
the Optional Protocol is specific on the treatment of juveniles. Silence in the statute leaves 
                                                                                                                               
 159. Id. ¶ 18. Note the curious use of the term “law of nations” rather than “war crimes.” 
 160. Defense Reply, supra note 102, at 1 (“The only question is whether Congress intended this law-of-
war commission to be the first to exercise that kind of jurisdiction . . .”). At least two scholarly 
examinations of the Khadr proceedings agree with that interpretation of the treaty. See Paola 
Konge, International Crimes & Child Soldiers, 16 SW. J. INT’L L. 41, 46–47 (2010); Daniel Ryan, 
International Law and Laws of War and International Criminal Law—Prosecution of Child 
Soldiers—United States v. Omar Ahmed Khadr, (Military Comm’n, Referred Apr. 24, 2004), 33 
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 175, 184 (2010). 
 161. Ruling on Motion to Dismiss—Personal Jurisdiction, supra note 76, at 3 n.8. 
 162. YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. RPT. FOR CONGRESS, 97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 16 (2008). 
 163. Ruling on Motion to Dismiss—MCA Jurisdiction, supra note 157, ¶ 19. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy (The Charming Betsy), 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“an 
act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible 
construction remains . . .”). 
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the courts to supplement that silence with the treaty source in order to provide faithful and 
consistent interpretation of governmental obligations. The later MCA, on its face, does not 
conflict with the earlier treaty, and says nothing as to abrogation of obligations under the 
Optional Protocol, which Congress explicitly found to be self-executing. 
Finally, the commission declined to reach the crucial issues briefed by the defense and 
amici dealing with what the presiding officer called “the United States’ duties and obligations 
concerning rehabilitation and reintegration of Mr. Khadr.”166 That issue, the commission 
concluded, “should be addressed to a forum other than a military commission.”167 
Alternatively, at least implicitly, the commission left this issue to the convening authority: 
“The Commission assumes, without deciding, that the Convening Authority considers the 
circumstances of each case and each accused before referring a case to trial. Whether or not 
being tried for alleged crimes is rehabilitative is not a question before this commission.”168 As 
noted earlier, the federal district court declined to hear this very same issue on grounds that 
it would be decided by the military commission first. Thus, this particular child challenging 
proceedings under the Optional Protocol was left without any forum to address the issue, as 
both defer to other authorities.169 It is here that the commission most clearly abdicated its 
responsibility to resolve the issue. 
IV.  Omar Khadr as a Child in the Canadian Courts 
At the same time that Omar’s case proceeded in the U.S. legal system, his family retained 
Canadian counsel to represent his interests in the Canadian courts.170 Their options for legal 
action on Omar’s behalf in the Canadian judicial system seemed extremely limited, due to 
Omar’s custody by the United States, but these lawyers fought courageously on Omar’s behalf 
through a series of challenges to the actions of the Canadian government in its conduct of 
foreign relations, and in visits by Canadian officials to Omar prior to Omar’s access to lawyers 
or the courts in any country. 
As one authority on the Canadian proceedings notes, three successive Canadian Prime 
Ministers refused to grant a request by the Khadr family for his repatriation, despite the fact 
that other U.S. allies had seen the release of their nationals from Guantanamo.171 The 
primary focus of the Canadian federal court litigation, with two appeals to the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                               
 166. Ruling on Motion to Dismiss—MCA Jurisdiction, supra note 157, ¶ 22. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at ¶ 17. 
 169. As argued above, the authority of the district court in habeas jurisdiction seems more appropriate as 
a forum to decide issues of the detainee’s status under international law. See supra text 
accompanying notes 140–50. 
 170. We met the Canadian lawyers, Nathan Whitling and Dennis Edney, private practitioners from 
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of Canada, related to two issues: first, visits by Canadian officials to Omar Khadr for 
intelligence purposes and the surrender of the fruits of those visits to U.S. officials; and 
second, the obligation of Canadian officials to formally seek repatriation of their national from 
Guantanamo. The responses by the Canadian courts, particularly the lower federal courts, 
provide, on the one hand, a stark contrast to the federal courts of the United States regarding 
the reception and application of international law to resolve domestic issues, although 
ultimately the Supreme Court of Canada resolved most issues exclusively on domestic 
grounds. On the other hand, these decisions cumulatively had virtually no impact on Omar’s 
liberty or his day-to-day life, simply because of the limits of territorial jurisdiction and the 
fact that Omar was in U.S. custody. 
The Supreme Court of Canada first dealt with the Omar Khadr case in 2008, when it held 
that the fruits of interviews with Omar Khadr, turned over to U.S. officials by Canadian 
intelligence officers during interviews with him at Guantanamo, had to be turned over to his 
Canadian lawyers.172 The lawyers argued that the source for his right to the materials in 
question lay in section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which guarantees 
protection of life, liberty and property, and the right not to be deprived of those rights except 
in accordance with “principles of fundamental justice.”173 Those principles, the Canadian 
courts had previously held, can be found in Canada’s obligations under international human 
rights law. The justices followed a simple analysis accepting that the effect of the decisions by 
the United States Supreme Court in the Rasul and Hamdan cases was that “the conditions 
under which Mr. Khadr was held and was liable for prosecution were illegal under both U.S. 
and international law at the time Canadian officials interviewed Mr. Khadr and gave 
information to U.S. authorities.”174 If Omar’s status as a juvenile was important to the court’s 
reasoning, it is not apparent from its ruling, which mentions only once in passing that Omar 
was fifteen years old at the time of his capture.175 But the litigation did not end with that 
decision; in fact, it was just beginning. 
The following year, a federal court in Toronto held that Omar had the right, also under 
section 7 of the Canadian Charter, to judicial review of the decision by the government not to 
request his repatriation. The knowing involvement by Canadian officials in Omar’s 
mistreatment in prison (the subject of the prior litigation) was sufficient to overcome the 
deference normally accorded to the executive branch in making repatriation decisions.176 
Most significantly, federal judge James O’Reilly did two things that no other court in the 
United States or Canada had done before. First, he relied on numerous international human 
rights instruments to inform his interpretation of section 7’s principles of fundamental 
justice: the Convention against Torture; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; and most 
importantly, the Protocol on Child Soldiers.177 Second, Judge O’Reilly relied heavily on 
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Omar’s status as a child in his rationale. That reliance merits a closer look, as it is unique 
among the decisions reviewed in this Article. Moreover, as appeals from Judge O’Reilly’s 
decision progressed, Omar’s status as a minor recedes in importance in the reasoning of the 
courts. 
Judge O’Reilly based his ruling firmly on a determination that “on detention, Mr. Khadr 
was ‘given no special status as a minor’ even though he was only 15 when he was arrested 
and 16 at the time he was transferred to Guantanamo Bay.”178 Immediately after this 
finding, the court noted that Canadian officials had been implicated in the “frequent flyer” 
program of sleep deprivation designed to make Omar more willing to provide intelligence. 
“Mr. Khadr was then a 17-year-old minor, who was being detained without legal 
representation, with no access to his family and no Canadian consular assistance.”179 Finally, 
in its reliance on the Optional Protocol, the court found that 
Canada was obliged to recognize that Mr. Khadr, being a child, was vulnerable to being 
caught up in armed conflict as a result of his personal and social circumstances in 2002 
and before. It cannot resile from its recognition of the need to protect minors, like Mr. 
Khadr, who are drawn into hostilities before they can apply mature judgment to the 
choices they face.180 
Remarkably, in reaching this conclusion, the court was not only relying on the text of the 
treaties, but interpreting Omar’s narrative with the same understanding that flows through 
the recent jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court on the role of cognitive brain 
development in the exercise of juvenile judgment.181 The court concluded that factors relevant 
to the consideration of the protection of Omar Khadr included “his youth; his need for medical 
attention; his lack of education; access to consular assistance and legal counsel; his inability 
to challenge his detention or conditions of confinement in a court of law; and his presence in 
an unfamiliar, remote and isolated prison, with no family contact.”182 These factors resonate 
not only in principles of human rights law but also in the core protections of the law of armed 
conflict regarding children. The government appealed the decision to an intermediate 
appellate court for further review. 
In the Federal Court of Appeal, new and highly relevant facts relating to Omar’s status as 
a minor emerged publicly for the first time. In its decision, the three-judge Court of Appeal in 
Ontario split 2 to 1, upholding the trial court’s decision that the government did not enjoy 
unfettered discretion in its decisions regarding requests for repatriation of Canadian 
                                                                                                                               
 178. Id. ¶ 9. The internal quotes are somewhat puzzling. There is no attribution of the source, thus 
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nationals from abroad.183 For the first time in public, the court recited a series of diplomatic 
notes sent by the Canadian government to its U.S. counterpart, some of which were sent 
before Omar’s transfer to Guantanamo. Two notes, sent in August and September of 2002 
while Omar was still held at Bagram, noted that he was a minor, requested that he not be 
transferred to Guantanamo, and “pointed out that the laws of Canada and the United States 
require special treatment for minors with respect to legal and judicial processes.”184 Notes 
sent in 2003, after Omar’s transfer to the base but before he had gained access to counsel, 
again requested “special consideration” of his status as a minor, and noted that he was not 
being treated like other juvenile detainees (July 9, 2003); requested assurances that he would 
not face the death penalty if charged with crimes (October 6, 2003); and requested assurances 
of medical treatment for injuries (November 12, 2003).185 No formal responses to any of these 
inquiries appeared in the appellate record. 
Aside from the possible relevance that these diplomatic notes might have had in our own 
litigation to seek independent medical treatment for Omar, they are vitally relevant views of 
Canadian government officials about juveniles in armed conflict. Without examining the legal 
basis of their assertions, one can draw two immediate inferences from their communications. 
First, Canadian officials, unlike the United States military, viewed Omar as a juvenile both 
at the time of his capture and his later detention to Guantanamo at age sixteen. Second, 
Canadian officials believed that as a juvenile, Omar was entitled to either entirely avoid 
detention at Guantanamo, or if held there, to conditions that vastly differed from those to 
which he was actually subjected. The transfer of the Afghan children to Camp Iguana and 
their treatment there provide a useful analogy. 
The Federal Court of Appeal, like the court of first instance, invoked the Convention 
against Torture and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, but the Optional Protocol is 
conspicuously absent from its reasoning.186 The reviewing court put more weight on 
mistreatment than juvenile status, providing extended analysis of the definition of torture 
and the link of the principle of fundamental justice to the prohibition on cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment, which is characterized as a peremptory or jus cogens norm of customary 
international law.187 In any event, the case would go to the highest court of Canada a second 
time. 
On January 29, 2010, in its second round of Khadr litigation, the Supreme Court of 
Canada overturned that aspect of the lower courts’ decisions dealing with repatriation, 
finding itself without the institutional competence to determine such diplomatic issues.188 By 
this time the case had attracted even more international attention, and a total of nine friend-
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of-court briefs were filed, all on Omar Khadr’s behalf.189 The high court, however, retreated to 
a posture similar to that taken in its 2008 decision on the matter, reiterating the 
constitutional violation of section 7, with only a whisper of international law. Its operative 
paragraph held as follows: 
Interrogation of a youth, to elicit statements about the most the serious criminal 
charges while detained in these conditions and without access to counsel, and while 
knowing that the fruits of the interrogations would be shared with the U.S. prosecutors, 
offends the most basic Canadian standards about the treatment of detained youth 
suspects.190 
Gone are all references to either the Torture Convention or the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child and the Optional Protocol. As one scholar notes, “The Court did not acknowledge 
the international legal arguments raised by either side” as to the relationship between 
fundamental justice and international human rights.191 Gone too is the court’s reliance, but 
for a small nod, on Omar Khadr’s status as a child as a determining factor in the 
determination of fundamental justice. 
The Canadian lawyers continued the fight, returning to litigate the issue in the lower 
courts. A lower federal court ordered the government to provide a list of potential remedial 
options for violation of Omar’s Charter rights,192 but an appellate court dismissed the matter 
as moot following Omar’s plea of guilty in military commission proceedings.193 This seems a 
sad denouement to the most far-reaching judicial intervention on behalf of the rights of the 
child seen in this review of litigation on behalf of Omar Khadr. 
V.  Omar Khadr as a Child in the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights and Other International Bodies 
This short section will deal with two dimensions of international advocacy regarding the 
Omar Khadr case. First, it will examine actions taken by students from the International 
Human Rights Law Clinic on behalf of Omar Khadr in the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights.194 It will then briefly summarize the other actions known by the author to 
have taken place in international bodies explicitly addressing Omar Khadr’s situation at 
Guantanamo Bay. 
A. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
Students began preparing submissions for the Inter-American Commission during the 
2005–06 school year when it became apparent that the U.S. courts would either ignore or 
skirt the most essential issues relating to his detention as a child. Finding no available forum 
within the United States, students developed a strategy of parallel litigation in the 
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international forum. Students prepared two documents: a contentious petition against the 
United States on behalf of Omar Khadr individually, and a request for precautionary 
measures. Both documents exhaustively examined international human rights law with 
regard to Omar Khadr’s situation. 
The Commission’s Rules of Procedure provide for precautionary measures in “serious and 
urgent situations” in order “to prevent irreparable harm to persons under the jurisdiction of 
the State concerned.”195 Precautionary measures are a kind of international injunctive action, 
and can be taken ex parte by the Commission; they may even be requested without the 
contemporaneous filing of a petition, as was the case with the original request for 
precautionary measures for all unnamed detainees in early 2002. Generally, requests for 
precautionary measures can be obtained quite quickly, often within days or weeks of filing. 
Contentious cases, unfortunately, have a much longer time frame, sometimes years before 
resolution. 
In our case, the matter was simplified by directions from our client. Omar, after careful 
consultation and explanation of the process, agreed to proceed with the request for 
precautionary measures, but explicitly requested that we not file the contentious petition on 
his behalf. We honored that request and filed only the precautionary measures request on 
January 17, 2006.196 The request was replete with allegations and legal sources on the 
protection of children in armed conflict. Students appeared at the Commission in early March 
of 2006 for oral presentation of the request to a panel of three commissioners, arguing against 
a large team of lawyers—civilian and military—from the U.S. delegation. Again, aspects of 
Omar’s status as a child stood out in the arguments on his behalf. On March 21, 2006, the 
Commission granted the request, asking the United States to take measures to protect Omar 
from further mistreatment during interrogations and to investigate his claims of torture at 
the hands of his interrogators.197 Remarkably, to our utter surprise and disappointment, the 
letter requesting precautionary measures made no mention of Omar’s age or status as a 
minor. We could only guess that his status did not figure in their calculus of urgency, but it 
certainly could have been relevant to risk of harm. There is no recorded response of the 
United States to the request. 
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B. Action in Other International Bodies 
The United Nations mechanisms for consideration of issues regarding children in armed 
conflict are numerous, and its activity on those issues is continuous. Examples include 
ongoing resolutions of the General Assembly on rights of the child198 and the reports of the 
Secretary General on children in armed conflict.199 Only rarely does the U.N., its treaty 
bodies or related agencies go on record with regard to specific cases. It has done so through at 
least three organs with regard to the Omar Khadr case: UNICEF (U.N. children’s agency); 
the general reporting process of the Committee on the Rights of the Child; and the Special 
Representative of the Secretary General on Children in Armed Conflict. Closely related 
events include the recent judgments in two international criminal tribunals, both of which 
found the defendants guilty of the recruitment and use of child soldiers: the trial of Thomas 
Lubanga by the International Criminal Court,200 and the trial of Charles Taylor by the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone.201 All will be discussed briefly here. 
As early as May 2008, UNICEF, the United Nations Children’s Fund, expressed “concern[] 
about the fate of Omar Khadr.”202 In a brief press announcement, the child protection 
spokesman at UNICEF, Geoffrey Keele, insisted that “Omar Khadr should be treated as a 
victim of adults rather than as a criminal.”203 His trial would, said Keele, “set a dangerous 
precedent for other children affected by conflict.”204 Two years later, when the Khadr trial 
seemed imminent, UNICEF spoke up again. Anthony Lake, a former national security 
advisor to President Clinton and now head of UNICEF, again spoke of the dangerous 
precedent of the case, called for prosecution of only the recruiters of children, and noted that 
the children “are victims, acting under coercion.”205 
The Committee on the Rights of the Child receives periodic reports from states parties to 
either the Convention on the Rights of the Child or its protocols. The United States submitted 
its first report on compliance with the Child Soldier Protocol in June of 2007.206 In 
conjunction with the U.S. submission of the report, which made no direct mention of either 
Guantanamo or Omar Khadr, the Committee submitted a list of written questions for 
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response. The written responses of the United States government to specific questions about 
Guantanamo and the children detained there noted and discussed the case of Omar Khadr in 
several paragraphs, all of which justified their actions as legal.207 
The Committee, as is customary, issued its concluding observations on the report of the 
United States in June of 2008.208 Again, although it did not explicitly mention Omar Khadr’s 
case, the observations were pointed. They expressed “concern” that children were being tried 
at Guantanamo for war crimes “rather then being considered primarily as victims,” and 
“without due account of their status as children.”209 The Committee recommended, inter alia, 
that “detention of children at Guantanamo Bay should be prevented,” and that children there 
be provided with “physical and psychological recovery measures, including educational 
programmes and sports and leisure activities, as well as measures for all detained children’s 
social reintegration.”210 
Radhika Coomaraswamy then served as the U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on Children in Armed Conflict. During 2009 and 2010, she boldly spoke out on at 
least five occasions about the pending charges and ultimate disposition of the Khadr case in 
military commission proceedings. Even before her official statements, there was a request by 
Omar’s military lawyers to permit a representative of her office to attend the Khadr military 
commission proceedings as an observer. The request was denied.211 
Her first public comments were in August of 2009, when Ms. Coomaraswamy welcomed 
the release of the other child in commission proceedings, Mohammed Jawad. The statement, 
headed as “All Juvenile Detainees Must be Released from Guantanamo,” quoted her as saying 
that the trial of a minor “would have created a dangerous international precedent” if Jawad’s 
case had proceeded.212 She expressed hope for the release of Omar Khadr “soon.” In October 
of 2009, the Special Representative ramped up her criticism. In an extended statement to the 
Third Committee of the U.N., she again welcomed the release of Mohammed Jawad from 
Guantanamo. What she then said about the Khadr case merits extended quotation: 
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[W]e look forward to similar action being taken with regard to Omar Khadr. Children 
should be made aware of the gravity of their acts but not in the context of a war crime 
prosecution. Children may be required to undergo procedures related to truth and 
reconciliation commissions or other restorative justice measures that are relevant to 
their societies, so that they understand that certain types of behaviour will not be 
tolerated. But we must not forget that they are primarily victims of adult cunning and 
cruelty, and therefore should be rehabilitated and assisted to find a constructive role in 
society.213 
In May and October of 2010, as proceedings in the military commission intensified, Ms. 
Coomaraswamy again spoke out against trial. In the May statement, she called on Canada 
and the United States to respect the spirit of the Optional Protocol on Child Soldiers, and to 
release Omar Khadr without trial. “Like other children abused by armed groups around the 
world who are repatriated to their home communities and undergo re-education for their 
reintegration,” she stated, “Omar should be given the same protections afforded these 
children.”214 In October of 2010, on the occasion of what was planned to be the start of his 
trial, she again spoke out strongly: “The Omar Khadr case will set a precedent that may 
endanger the status of child soldiers all over the world.”215 Despite her escalating words, 
Omar’s case proceeded to its conclusion. Her final action was a letter sent from her office to 
“members of the military commission,” dated 27 October 2010, after Omar’s plea of guilty but 
before his final sentencing. The letter was her most direct and most passionate. She 
reiterated the obligation of parties of the Optional Protocol on Child Soldiers to “support . . . 
reintegra[tion] into their families and communities and that states parties should provide any 
necessary assistance to these children wherever they are found.” She radically shifted the 
Omar Khadr narrative by arguing that the facts show that “[i]n every sense Omar represents 
the classic child soldier narrative; recruited by unscrupulous groups to undertake actions at 
the bidding of adults to fight battles they barely understand.”216 
Finally, two recent decisions from international criminal tribunals, just as this Article goes 
to press, merit mention here, although they do not directly invoke the Khadr proceedings. 
First, on March 14, 2012, the International Criminal Court announced its first conviction in 
the case of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, from the Democratic Republic of Congo, for the 
recruitment and use of child soldiers. Only a month later, on April 26, 2012, the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone issued its judgment in the case of Charles Taylor, who had sat as head of 
state in Liberia prior to his arrest, with a finding of guilt on similar charges, among others. 
These were not the first such convictions by an international tribunal condemning the 
recruitment and use of child soldiers, but they were further demonstrations of the general 
trend to treat the child in armed conflict as a victim, with primary responsibility falling 
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where it should—with the adults who draw children into the web of armed conflict. Elizabeth 
Schauer, called as the court’s expert witness on child soldiers in the Lubanga case, put it ever 
so succinctly when she wrote in her report to the court that children in armed conflict “are 
victimised two-fold, since they are first exposed to traumatic experiences and later are 
blamed and stigmatised for the atrocities they have committed.”217 
VI.  Conclusion: The Outcome of the Khadr Case and the 
 Intersections of Humanitarian and Human Rights Law for a 
 Child Charged with War Crimes 
At age twenty-four, after spending more than a third of his young life in U.S. detention, 
and nearly five years after he was initially charged with any crime, Omar Khadr pled guilty 
to multiple war crimes before a military commission at Guantanamo Bay on October 13, 
2010. Though captured at age fifteen, at no time did the U.S. government, in or out of court, 
ever acknowledge him as a juvenile, as a minor, or as a child. No U.S. court overtly recognized 
his childhood as a jurisdictional, procedural or mitigating factor in their decision-making. 
Neither courts nor other institutions treated him as a child under international or U.S. law, 
both of which call for rehabilitation as the primary mission of juvenile justice. Omar Khadr 
was treated as an adult for all purposes. One may, however, see some glimmer of leniency in 
the actions of the prosecution and court in accepting a less severe sentence than might have 
been acceptable for the offenses charged, which may offer some element of redemption in 
Omar’s treatment. Taken together with the offers of possible help with education upon his 
release, the issue of his youth may have played some mitigating role. 
This final section will first examine the outcome of his case and the accompanying 
narrative of Omar Khadr himself, and then explore some aspects of the interaction of 
international human rights and humanitarian law in his case in broader perspective. 
A. The Outcome: Omar Khadr Pleads Guilty and Returns to Canada 
The charges to which Omar Khadr pleaded guilty included the crimes of murder and 
attempted murder “in violation of the laws of war,” conspiracy, material support for 
terrorism, and spying. In the narrowest sense, both factually and legally, the stipulation of 
facts accompanying Omar Khadr’s guilty plea contains all of the relevant “truth” about why 
Khadr’s detention is justified as a matter of law. He admitted to the veracity of those facts in 
open court. The stipulation bears extended quotation here, as it is relevant to the ensuing 
discussion on his accountability for those events, whether as a soldier or as a child. Because, 
of course, the factual stipulation, the product of a twisted and vengeful Guantanamo legal 
system, is not, and can never be, Omar’s own story, a story that has never been fully told by 
him. 
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What follows is only that portion of the stipulation that gave rise to the charge of “murder 
in violation of the laws of war” for the death of Sgt. Christopher Speer, part of the U.S. 
military force involved in the incident in question: 
 On 27 July 2002, Khadr was at a compound in Ayub Kheil with the al Qaeda 
explosives cell. U.S. forces received information that suspected members of al Qaeda 
were operating out of the compound and were conducting attacks against U.S. and 
coalition forces. Prior to the Americans arriving, Khadr and the other cell members 
received word that the Americans were coming to their location. While the owner of the 
compound, Aman Ullah, fled, Khadr stayed behind in order to fight the Americans. U.S. 
forces then moved to the compound and asked the occupants, including Khadr, to come 
outside of the compound to talk to the U.S. forces. At that time, Khadr knew that the 
forces outside the compound were American. The request to the al Qaeda members was 
relayed in both English and Pashto (the primary language in Afghanistan). Khadr is 
and was at that time fluent in both English and Pashto. 
 When Khadr and the other al Qaeda cell members refused to come outside of the 
compound or to speak to the U.S. forces, two members of the accompanying Afghan 
Military Forces entered the main compound, raised their heads above a wall and again 
asked for the occupants of the compound to come out and speak to the U.S. led forces. 
At that moment, individuals in the house opened fire, instantly killing both Afghan 
soldiers. U.S. soldiers pulled the Afghan soldiers out of the compound and a four-hour 
firefight between U.S. soldiers and the al Qaeda cell commenced. 
. . . . 
 Close air support was called in by the US forces. A-10s [ground-attack fighter jets] 
and Apache attack helicopters dropped bombs (including two 500 pound bombs) and 
fired thousands of rounds of ammunition into the compound. During the bombing, 
Khadr was injured in the eyes and leg by shrapnel from a U.S. grenade. 
. . . . 
 After the U.S. forces believed the firefight was over, they began clearing the 
compound. A U.S. Special Forces unit entered the compound. It was the belief of the 
U.S. forces that all individuals inside the compound had been killed during the battle. 
After entering the compound the unit began taking direct fire from an AK-47. One 
soldier saw the individual firing the AK-47, engaged and killed him. 
 Upon hearing the U.S. Special Forces soldiers, Khadr, positioned behind a crumbling 
wall, armed and threw a Russian F-l grenade in the vicinity of the talking soldiers. 
Khadr threw the grenade with the specific intent of killing or injuring as many 
Americans as he could. The grenade thrown by Khadr exploded near Sergeant First 
Class (“SFC”) Christopher Speer, launching shrapnel into his head and causing mortal 
brain damage. SFC Speer was killed by the grenade that Khadr threw. He died 
approximately 12 days later on 8 August 2002.218 
This snippet of the stipulation of fact is but a small part of an extended narrative which 
includes information about Omar’s family, his activities in Afghanistan before his capture, 
and a general profile of al-Qaeda terrorist ends and activities (one that was included, in one 
version or another, in the “evidence” supporting charges against all of those appearing in 
military commission proceedings, and without any discernible nexus to the actions of the 
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accused).219 Notably, the stipulation contains no information about the nature or conditions of 
Omar’s detention or his treatment during interrogation. Although Omar’s age at the time of 
his capture is mentioned, it is not offered as a ground for mitigation of his sentence, at least 
on the record. 
The death of Sgt. Speer, and Omar Khadr’s responsibility for it was the heart of the 
prosecution. Yet many observers have raised serious questions about whether Omar threw 
the grenade that killed Speer. Though he allegedly confessed to the killing, his lawyers 
argued and lost on the question of whether Omar’s statements were coerced or involuntary, 
the product of harsh, repeated and continuous interrogations. There was also the troubling 
statement by a U.S. commando at the compound in Afghanistan, mistakenly provided to 
reporters during a pre-trial commission hearing in February 2008. The report by the soldier, 
known as OC-1, describes the moments after the grenade was thrown: 
He heard moaning coming from the back of the compound. The dust rose up from the 
ground and began to clear, he then saw a man facing him lying on his right side . . . The 
man had an AK-47 on the ground beside him and the man was moving. OC-1 fired one 
round striking the man in the head and the movement ceased. Dust was again stirred 
by this rifle shot. When the dust rose, he saw a second man sitting up facing away from 
him leaning against the brush. This man, later identified as Khadr, was moving . . . 
OC-1 fired two rounds both of which struck Khadr in the back. OC-1 estimated that 
from the initiation of the approach to the compound to shooting Khadr took no more 
than 90 seconds, with all of the events inside the compound happening in less than a 
minute.220 
The military’s own document thus confirms that Omar Khadr was sitting down on the 
ground, facing away from the entrance, and was shot twice immediately after the troops 
entered, casting doubt on his ability to lob a grenade beyond the compound’s walls at that 
moment or just before. The doubt injected into the commission proceedings by this document 
was shared by many. One NGO observer of the Khadr proceedings opined: 
Although the government did not appear to have any forensic or eyewitness testimony 
to support its murder charge, government interrogators planned to testify that Khadr 
had willingly told them that he threw the grenade that killed Sergeant First Class 
Christopher Speer. Whether he said that because it was true, or because he was a 
scared and wounded 15-year-old expecting a quick release for telling his interrogators 
what they wanted to hear, we’ll never know.221 
Another observer, Andrea Prasow, had worked as a civilian in the commission’s military 
defense office before going to work for Human Rights Watch. She had visited with Omar 
Khadr at Guantanamo. Her conclusions on the sentencing hearing bear extended quotation: 
 The plea agreement leaves many questions unanswered. Indeed, we will never even 
know for sure if Khadr was responsible for killing a US soldier. Prior to the trial, there 
were compelling indications that another al Qaeda militant actually threw the grenade 
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that killed Sergeant Speer. Even if scientific developments would make greater 
certainty possible in the future, Khadr’s plea agreement includes a promise never to 
pursue forensic testing of the evidence, and allows the US government to destroy all the 
evidence following sentencing. Khadr has also waived all appeals and promised not to 
pursue litigation against the US government in any forum for any matter relating to 
his detention and trial. No jury will ever hear Khadr’s allegations of abuse or the 
admissions of abuse by a US interrogator.222 
There were, of course, other serious charges, and Omar Khadr pled guilty to every charge. 
What appeared clearest from the sentencing proceedings, however, was that a U.S. soldier 
had died at the hands of terrorists, and Omar Khadr, the sole survivor of that tragic day, 
would pay the price. 
In return for Omar Khadr’s plea of guilty, the Convening Authority for military 
commissions agreed not to approve a sentence of confinement of greater than eight years, 
with no credit for time served (as required under the military commissions statute), and 
further that after at least one more year at Guantanamo, he was eligible to be transferred to 
Canada to serve out the remainder of his sentence under Canadian law.223 This complex 
agreement, however, did not settle the matter of sentencing. In what might be described as 
bizarre kabuki theater, performed exclusively for the press, a full sentencing hearing in the 
Khadr case was held before a sentencing jury of military men in Guantanamo just after he 
entered his plea of guilty. It was agreed that if the jury returned a sentence greater than the 
eight years for which Omar had bargained, he would serve only the eight years agreed to 
previously. If the verdict was lower, he would receive the more lenient sentence. 
At the sentencing hearing, the prosecution was permitted to put on testimony from Sgt. 
Layne Morris, a soldier injured during Omar’s capture, and Tabitha Speer, the widow of 
Christopher Speer, the U.S. soldier who died in the compound.224 A controversial “expert,” 
Michael Welner, also testified for the prosecution, calling Omar an “al-Qaeda rock star.”225 
Another expert, Navy Capt. Patrick McCarthy, testified for the defense and described Omar 
as a “model prisoner, respectful and helpful to military personnel.”226 The military sentencing 
panel passed a sentence of forty years imprisonment on October 31, 2010. That sentence 
became the public narrative of the Defense Department, touting the efficacy of military 
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commissions.227 It was, however, legally irrelevant, as the plea deal meant that Omar would 
serve only the eight years to which all parties agreed previously. A post-plea petition for 
clemency, submitted to the Pentagon by Omar’s military lawyers, was swiftly rejected in May 
of 2011.228  
There is yet another post-script to the Omar Khadr saga. As this Article went to press, in 
late September 2012, two full years after his sentencing, Omar Khadr was repatriated to 
Canada.229 Most of the press assumed that the plea agreement required that after one 
additional year at Guantanamo, or about the end of October 2011, Omar would be transferred 
to serve the remainder of his eight-year sentence in Canada, with the domestic law of Canada 
controlling the issues of his release from prison.230 Canadian news media noted that a 
request for transfer had been lodged by the Canadian attorneys, but that Canadian officials 
had said that even without objections, “a decision could take up to 18 months.”231 The delays 
in his transfer also had adverse effects on other cases pending in military commissions in 
Cuba. One article noted that the chief military prosecutor there was seeking to strike plea 
deals with other low-level detainees in return for their testimony against more significant 
suspects. Those “inmates are growing distrustful that the main inducement prosecutors can 
offer them—the prospect of leaving by a defined date—is meaningful, defense lawyers say. 
That mistrust, in turn, is complicating efforts to win more plea deals.”232 
U.S. officials noted that they could not act until they received a formal request, and that 
new U.S. law requires, as part of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012, that the 
Secretary of Defense certify to Congress that “Canada is a fit place to send a convicted 
terrorist, a nation not likely to permit him to attack the United States, and one that has 
control of its prisons.”233 The pre-trial agreement signed before Omar’s guilty plea explicitly 
stated that non-acceptance by the Canadian government of an application for transfer “will 
have no impact on this agreement.”234 Omar’s return, of course, did nothing to quell the 
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controversy over what he had done and who he now is.235 Omar’s lawyers asserted that he 
seeks only to be a normal Canadian, and “is desperate to be a normal, contributing member of 
society.”236 
One other positive event in the post-sentencing context is the arrangement by his defense 
lawyers for his continuing education while in detention. Omar’s Canadian defense team 
arranged for a Canadian university professor to design a home-schooling program to assist in 
his preparation to return to society. The curriculum includes materials in math, history and 
astronomy, and is “heavy on English grammar.”237 Military lawyers visit with Omar every 
other week to go over the material with him. If he completes the high school-level studies, he 
plans to apply to a college or university as a “mature student.”238 Omar also began a touching 
correspondence with a college professor, Arlette Zinck, who teaches English at King’s 
University in Edmonton, Alberta. Their exchange of letters was offered as evidence by the 
defense during his sentencing hearing, but no formal arrangement with that university has 
been reached.239  
Omar Khadr made a formal statement at his sentencing hearing. This was one of the few 
times he had spoken publicly since his detention—he had never testified in open court, and 
the others had been brief statements during his commission proceedings. His voice was 
otherwise silenced. He noted that his education stopped at eighth grade, that his hobbies 
were sports and reading. His biggest dream was to get out of Guantanamo, then to become a 
doctor. Invoking Nelson Mandela, he had concluded that “you’re not going to gain anything 
with hate . . . love and forgiveness are more constructive and will bring people together.”240 
He stood and spoke directly to Tabitha Speer: “I’m really sorry for the pain I’ve caused you 
and your family. I wish I could do something that would take this pain away from you. This is 
all I can say.”241 
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What then is the “true” story of Omar Khadr, the child-man of Guantanamo? In a 
forthcoming book on “reimagining” child soldiers, Professor Mark Drumbl suggests that what 
he calls the “international legal imagination,” essentializes the child soldier into one of four 
images: the “guileless naïf,” “irreparable damaged goods,” the “hero,” or the “demon and 
bandit.” The first category, what alternatively might be called the “faultless passive victim,” 
carries great weight in the hierarchy of these images in that imagination.242 His overall point 
is that this is too narrow a vision of the child soldier, one that dehumanizes the real children. 
The legal imagination, he argues, must construct a more nuanced view of the child in armed 
conflict.243 
Without question, it was the mission of the United States government, largely through the 
Pentagon and the White House, to characterize all of the publicly known children at 
Guantanamo as demons and bandits, what Drumbl details as “irredeemable, baleful, and 
sinister. Pursuant to this depiction, the child soldier is a ticking time-bomb, bad seed, and 
warped soul incorrigibly determined.”244 Such was clearly the intent of General Myers and 
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld in the excerpt included as one of three headnotes to this 
Article. Once cast in this mold, investment in rehabilitation of the demon seems pointless.245 
My own view is informed by sitting with Omar for hours at a time over many, many 
sessions. Sometimes these sessions were intense and emotional, and sometimes they were 
boring, but we discussed virtually all aspects of his young life, at least those he was willing to 
disclose. By the time we met him, of course, he was already eighteen years old, but he was 
still a boy. He was small and had almost no facial hair. He fit none of the four images 
proposed by Drumbl; not even close. Omar was certainly neither demon nor bandit. He was, 
in my view, a highly adaptable and social survivor, someone who could use his easy and 
genuine smile, as well as his multiple linguistic skills (English, Arabic, Pashtu and Urdu at 
least) to provide easy access to almost any community. He had a kind of innate sensitivity to 
the emotions of others that he used as a barometer for his own reactions to them. He read a 
good deal; Harry Potter was a favorite. I never felt that he kept the truth from us over time, 
at least as he experienced it. To me, he was an honest, sincere and eminently likable kid.246 
B. A Few Reflections on the Operation of International Law in the 
Khadr Case 
When and how did international human rights and humanitarian law interact in judicial 
decisions of the U.S. courts involving Omar Khadr? The answer is simple: almost never. 
When one adds the decisions of Canadian courts and international bodies, the answer 
becomes a bit more complex, but not exponentially so. The simple fact is that there was 
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precious little interaction of legal doctrines on children in armed conflict in any dispositive 
decision in Omar Khadr’s case. This is certainly true in the jurisprudence of the Supreme 
Court of Canada, and in the precautionary measures decision of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights. Before examining those precious few instances where 
interaction did occur, it might be useful to reflect on why international law on children, 
whether in armed conflict or not, was so scarce in operative court decisions. There are obvious 
as well as more subtle answers to why the courts avoided the international law issues 
relating to children. 
The most obvious reason the courts ignored international law relating to children has to do 
with my repeated invocation of context. The voice of the government in responding to the 
attacks of 9/11 was, not to coin a phrase, extremely loud and incredibly close. If possible, that 
voice was even further amplified by the Pentagon’s hired “message force multipliers,” (as only 
the military could so designate), individuals provided by the armed services with talking 
points to present when they appeared as supposedly neutral military analysts on television or 
in other media.247 The drumbeat for vengeance was strong and constant, and the Khadr 
family, with identified ties to al-Qaeda, was an easy target. Omar’s own young, inexperienced 
and isolated voice was a tiny whisper by comparison, nearly gagged by government 
restrictions on communication with the outside world. Above all, an American soldier had 
died, and Omar was believed to be responsible. Notably, even the most sympathetic scholars 
writing on the Omar Khadr case often accept the narrative of Omar as trained and hardened 
terrorist operative. 
A second obvious reason for non-distinction as a child was that Omar Khadr was part of 
the huge Guantanamo “collective,” a group of 779 people with extremely complex legal issues, 
issues that three trips to the United States Supreme Court have left far from settled. From 
the very start, those larger issues pulled attention away from more isolated issues such as 
juvenile status. This was nowhere more apparent than in the decision of Judge Green in the 
U.S. district court, dealing with the most crucial common issues of the eleven detainees before 
her and summarily dismissing all others, including the application of any of the treaties 
dealing with children in armed conflict, and virtually the entire body of customary 
international law. Her decision on that matter technically precluded consideration of the 
issue by the U.S. federal courts for years. A third and related issue is the general antipathy 
by the U.S. courts to reaching any issue of moment through the invocation of international 
human rights or humanitarian law as the doctrinal fulcrum. U.S. courts have shown their 
discomfort, usually through inexperience, with these bodies of law, as well as their distinctive 
inclination towards domestic law for resolution of complex or underdeveloped areas. The 
Bush and Obama Administrations have both shrewdly played to that discomfort by further 
blurring definitions to justify strong executive discretion in terrorism cases. 
One final factor deserves mention, one so obvious as to sometimes slip by unnoticed. That 
is the simple passage of time. Detained at fifteen, by the time he arrived at Guantanamo, 
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Omar was sixteen. By the time he saw anyone other than interrogators or guards, Omar was 
a legal adult of eighteen. By the time criminal charges were brought, he was nineteen, well 
over six feet tall with full, dark facial hair. He looked adult. And by the time pre-trial 
skirmishing began in earnest, he was well into the second decade of his life. It was, in my 
view, crucial to the analysis of Omar’s situation by Judge Bates, in both of the initial habeas 
challenges by Omar, that he purportedly sought prospective protection only, and that the 
protections accorded to adults were not the same as those for children. Although, logically, the 
law to be applied is that of the time of the original alleged offenses, when Omar was a young 
fifteen, it was hard to see him for anything other than the strapping adult he appeared to be 
in the courtroom. Although the unreasonable passage of time from offense to trial, totally 
apart from domestic speedy trial concepts, is a relevant factor in international human rights 
law,248 that issue is not unique to juveniles, and for all of the reasons stated above, would 
likely have been as unavailing as the others. 
There were a few occasions when the courts and U.N. bodies did look at how the question 
of Omar’s childhood should be understood through international law. Curiously, when given 
the clearest opportunity to do that, based on pleadings and friend-of-court submissions, 
neither the federal district court nor the military commission reached the issue at all, with 
both Judge Bates and the presiding officer deferring based on purely domestic legal 
interpretations. Judge James O’Reilly, in Canada, applied international norms in his federal 
court ruling of April 2009 relating to judicial review of an executive branch decision not to 
repatriate. Judge O’Reilly read “fundamental justice” notions in section 7 of the Canadian 
Charter through human rights law, with some reliance on humanitarian law. He relied on 
the Convention against Torture for its definition of torture and for its provisions relating to 
the duty not to use evidence obtained by torture in judicial proceedings.249 As to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, he again largely relied on portions of that treaty 
dealing with human rights, with no additional sources.250 The Protocol on Child Soldiers also 
figured in his decision, although only marginally. He found that it had no direct application to 
Canada in Omar Khadr’s circumstances, but that it is based on “broader principles” set out in 
the preamble which recognize the special needs of children vulnerable to recruitment of child 
victims of armed conflict, and to provide for rehabilitation and reintegration.251 As such, the 
Optional Protocol was invoked more for its human rights dimensions than any other reason. 
In the court of appeals’ review of the O’Reilly decision, as noted above, review on 
international law grounds was narrower than the federal court. The Ontario Court of Appeals 
invoked the Torture Convention and the Convention on the Rights of the Child in its 
interpretation of section 7 obligations of fundamental justice, but the latter treaty only with 
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regard to its protections of children against torture and other cruel treatment.252 Thus, the 
appellate court was more narrowly relying on general human rights norms, and not explicitly 
on Omar’s status as a child as a source for relief. 
The U.N. bodies present an interesting contrast. These bodies have a certain uniformity to 
their approach. All use the language of Omar Khadr as “victim” rather than soldier. UNICEF 
and the Committee on the Rights of the Child made general references, respectively, to the 
need for “special protection” of children, and to the need to give “due account to [Guantanamo 
detainees’] status as children.” Both of these invoke general human rights obligations to 
children. Not surprisingly, however, the Special Representative on Children in Armed 
Conflict and the Committee on the Rights of the Child, reviewing U.S. compliance with the 
Optional Protocol on Child Soldiers, focused on state obligations to rehabilitate and 
reintegrate, both notions that arise in the context of humanitarian law. Both UNICEF and 
the Special Representative pointed to the risky or dangerous precedent set by the U.S. 
decision to prosecute a child for war crimes, also a concept related to humanitarian law, with 
implicit human rights guarantees of due process and fair trial. None of the U.N. bodies to 
speak to the issue stepped beyond the narrow confines of their mandates, or a narrow reading 
of international instruments, to apply or suggest the use of additional norms from either 
human rights or humanitarian law.253 
In the final analysis, the tribunals that could have held the United States to account for its 
non-compliance with international law utterly failed to do so. As such, they abdicated a 
responsibility not only to Omar Khadr but to us all. 
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